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ABSTRACT
During the 1980's the Soviet Union underwent a decade
of dramatic change.

The study of these changes initiated

by the Gorbachev government has focused primarily on the
reforms initiated by the state- perestroika from above.
However, by the mid 1980's it was apparent that the state
was not so much reforming society as society was drastically
altering the state.

Some analysts at this time began to

shift to examining reforms at the grassroots levelperestroika from below.
This thesis is an examination of these perestroika
from below reforms.

The thesis seeks to asses the

usefulness of the civil society model in describing and
explaining the dramatic nature of this change.

Informal

associations, a key element of a functional civil society,
are examined to analyze the extent of their importance
to the Gorbachev era reforms.
The analysis of the usefulness of both the civil
society model and its informal associations is historically
grounded.

The thesis analyzes the historic growth and

evolution of the civil society idea from late Imperial
Russia to the late Soviet period in 1989.

The analysis

of the Gorbachev era focuses on the changing Soviet society
i

and its contribution to the reform process.
The thesis concludes that the civil society model,
while having some deficiencies, overall helps to explain
the dramatic nature of change occurring in the Soviet Union
in the 1980's.

The analysis also supports the critical

importance of informal associations in fostering and
assisting democratization efforts.

However, the work notes

that there are significant obstacles in the path of further
development of civil society

ii

DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my mother and father.
Without their assistance, both emotional and fiscal, this
project would have been impossible to complete.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There are a number of individuals to whom I owe a
great debt of gratitude to for their assistance in the
completion of this work.

I owe my largest debt of gratitude

to my thesis advisor Dr. Larry Thorsen.

His guidance and

insight, along with his meticulous proofreading, have
enabled me to complete a work I am proud of.
goes to Dr. Anita Shelton.

My next thanks

Her assistance was invaluable

in providing me with an understanding of Russian/Soviet
history.

Also, importantly, she acted as a sounding board

for my ideas and gently guided me back to the right path
when my intellect began to stray.

Lastly, thank you to

Jim Conley, Doug Julian, Steve Friedel and Brian Turner.
Without their patience for a never ending house guest this
endeavor would have been much more costly.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT.

i

Chapter
I.

INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1

II.

ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
CIVIL SOCIETY AND INFORMAL ASSOCIAITONS IN
RUSSIA • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

13

...

69

III.
IV.

v.

SOVIET SOCIETY UNDER GORBACHEV •

IMPEDIMENTS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL
SOCIETY IN THE SOVIET UNION • • • • • • • • 100
CONCLUSIONS • •

..........

• • • • 1 08

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
When bad men combine, the good must associate;
else they will fall one by one, unpitied victims
in a contemptible battle.
Edmund Burke
The Gorbachev era will likely be remembered for
its valiant effort to reform the corrupt and inept
socialist state that the Soviet Union had become by the
1980's.

However, Gorbachev's reforms were far more than

an attempt to save a faceless political system.

They

were a desperate attempt to pull Soviet society back into
the political system and give socialism a "human face."
This attempt to unify society and state in the Soviet
Union was at the core of the reforms.

The importance

of this attempt to heal the schism between society and
state has often been minimized by Western analysts.

The

myopia was fueled by models that viewed the Soviet
political system as monolithic and its leaders immune
to the influence of public opinion. The impact of this
minimization of society's importance in the Soviet system
was to focus research in the Gorbachev era dominantly
on official state reforms or "perestroika from above."
This focus, exacerbated by problems with access to data,
led to a great underestimation of the importance of the
development and growth of informal organizations in the
USSR, often refered to as "perestroika from below."
1

This thesis will analyze the utility of the civil
society model by examining its usefulness in explaining
the societal change that occurred under Gorbachev in the
Soviet Union.

This analysis of the model will be based

on how well it answers the following questions.

First,

to what extent does the civil society model help explain
the nature of change that occurred in the Soviet Union
under Gorbachev?

Second, to what degree, does this model

have indigenous roots in the Soviet experience? Third,
what, if any, predictive validity does this model show?
To answer these questions it will be necessary to examine
historical fact, quantative data concerning the nature
of informal associations, and political analysis of the
Gorbachev era reforms.

This model may be able to help

explain, more than others, the complexities and subtleties
of grass-roots movements in the USSR.

This thesis will

not focus on either the separatist movements in the former
Soviet Republics in the late 1980's or on the great
resurgence of religious organizations, in particular,
the Orthodox Church. While both of these spheres of
non-state activity are of great importance, current
systematic data does not allow for their analysis.

Rather,

this research shall rely primarily on informal associations
in the RSFSR because the most data is available concerning
these groups.
Most of the data used for this thesis consists of

2

secondary source material.

The secondary sources consulted

rely heavily on primary source material from Soviet
governmental and other Russian sources.

Quantitative

data used in this paper is based on official Soviet
governmental estimates and available sociological and
public opinion data.

This type of quantitative data was

used because within the study of Soviet informal
associations it has become the standard.
The evidence examined will be cases of informal
associations in Russia in the pre-Soviet, Soviet and
Gorbachev periods, which displayed civic (democratic,
participatory) attitudes and actions.

The extent to which

they displayed civic attitudes and actions will determine
the applicability of the model to Russia.

Precise

measurement of either attitudes or the extent to which
they were manifested in political action is not possible.
Neither will influence be measured since it is not readily
identifiable in any situation.

The criteria used will

therefore be whether or not the organizations attempted
to participate in the political process in an open,
pluralist fashion, in spite of the police state.

Those

that did will be considered to have been acting in a manner
supportive of civic attitudes, and thus consistent with
the components of the civil society model.

If such

activity is found to have been common among the
organizations surveyed, we may conclude that, contrary
3

to conventional assumptions, the civil society model is
applicable to the study of political interaction in Russia
during these periods.
A review of literature in the field shows the
evolution of thought about the importance of societial
change in Gorbachev's reforms.

In the first works

published about Gorbachev's reforms most analysis was
focused exculsively on the top down reforms, the
"perestroika from above." As society took on a more
activist role top analysts attempted to develop a
theoretical approach to understand its role.

Moshe Lewin

in his 1989 book, The Gorbachev Phenomenon, is acknowledged
to have been the first to suggest a philosophical basis
for the change that was occuring within society.

According

to Lewin, this basis was that Soviet society was becoming
increasingly "civil." In adopting the civil society model
as a way to view social change in the Soviet Union, Lewin
was invoking a concept with a diverse and deep
philosophical tradition, as will be examined later.
However, in Lewin's book, this, by his own admission
important concept, is dealt with in only a few pages.
Missing is a detailed examination of the history of the
concept, its importance to democratic movements in the
late 1980's in the Soviet Union, and, most importantly,
an analysis of the importance of the core of civil society,
informal associations. Since Lewin's writing, the term
4

"civil society" has been increasingly applied to explain
the scope and nature of change occurring in the Soviet
Union.

Both Geoffrey Hosking's The Awakening of the Soviet

Union, and Hederick Smith's The New Russians, used this
concept throughout their analyses to demonstrate the
fundamental nature of the change that "perestroika from
below" caused.

Their research, while using the concept,

once again does not devote much attention to the actual
manifestations of civil society, informal associations,
that were rapidly growing in the late 1980's.
The literature on informal associations grew rapidly
as the civil society model gained acceptance and actual
informal associations swelled in number. These writings,
such as Vladimir Brovkin's article on informal political
associations in the journal Soviet Studies, or Nicolai
Petro's chapter on voluntary associations contained in
Alfred Rieber and Alvin Rubinstein's Perestroika at the
Crossroads, dealt with the concept of civil society only
in passing.

They were primarily concerned with examining

the manifestation of these changes, the actual
associations, their numbers, demographic makeup, political
views, etc. The authors did not, for the most part, analyze
the broader concept of civil society. Also, this research
on informal associations did not examine the roots or
history of informal associations in the Soviet Union.
However, their research provides important data about
5

the nature and extent of informal associations in the
Soviet Union.
A review of the literature about civil society and
informal associations in the Soviet Union reveals some
deficiencies. First, the civil society concept, while
widely acknowledged as illuminating the nature of change
in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, has not been analyzed
in great detail. Second, work on informal associations,
a critical part of civil society, has tended to focus
on the actual characteristics of these groups, neglecting
to examine their deeper theoretical role as part of civil
society.

This thesis will remedy these deficiencies by

analyzing the background of the civil society concept,
its informal associations, and the historical development
of informal associations in the Soviet Union.
In order to accomplish this goal, this thesis will
focus on the origins, growth, and importance of informal
organizations within the Soviet Union from late Imperial
Russia until 1990, with a particular emphasis on their
greatest period of growth under Gorbachev.

1990 was chosen

as the cut-off point for analysis of the importance of
these groups for a number of reasons.

First, there is

a lack of data on informal associations past 1990.

The

August 1991 coup, and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet
Union, quickly shifted most academic analysis into why
the coup had occurred and the likely effects of the
6

dissolution of the Soviet state.

Consequently, research

on social movements and informal associations was minimized
while many analysts shifted to more pressing policy
problems. Second, most of the growth of informal
associations happened in the late 1980's.

Thus, analysis

of this period contains the richest quality and quantity
of data on informal associations, their growth and
importance.

Last, this 1990 cut-off date was chosen

because the last discernible impact of the groups occurred
then. This point is not to suggest that these groups have
not and are not having an impact in the successor
Commonwealth of Independent States.

Rather, the impact

of informal associations in creating a new pluralistic
political system can not be measured because the process
is still on-going.

The Civil Society Model

Civil society is not a new concept developed in recent
political philosophy.

Rather, the concept has been seen

at least since the fourteenth century as an answer to
how the "good life" can be achieved (Walzer, 1989, 29).
As far back as Periclean Athens, the term was used to
distinguish the civilized from the barbaric.

It became

a more developed concept during the Italian Renaissance
7

when Machiavelli and others tied it to the rule of law.
After the Italian Renaissance, the term became increasingly
intertwined with commercial society.

Indeed, for many

philosophers, from Locke to Marx, the concept of civil
society could not exist independently of the ability to
own private property (Howe, 1989,32).

This philosophical

development made civil society by definition anathema
to those who wanted communism.
The concept of civil society holds as its core the
idea that society is distinct from government and that
the state is but one institution within a pluralistic
environment (Starr, 1988,35).

This distinction was made

clear by Edward Shils in his discussion of the concept
when he wrote:

The idea of civil society is the idea of a part of
the state which has a life of its own, which is
distinctly different from the state, and which is
largely in autonomy from it. Civil society lies
beyond the boundaries of the family and the clan
and beyond the locality;it lies short of the state.
(1991,3).
The autonomy described is protected in a full fledged
civil society by the rule of law that codifies freedom
of speech, protection of minority rights, freedom of
association, etc. (Starr, 1988,35).

It is important to

note that in a Communist political system any decision
to stand outside of the officially sanctioned method of
8

participation is necessarily a political act.

Thus,

regardless of the specific focus of an informal
association, all of their members in a Communist state
are to a very real extent taking political action by not
channeling their activities into official organizations
(Tismaneanu, 1990,11).
One obvious problem of the use of this concept is
its applicability to the Soviet Union.

A major argument

used against applying the concept has been that it lacks
any indigenous philosophical or historical roots in the
Russian experience.

Opponents argue that it is a "foreign"

concept to Soviet society and thus could not possibly
explain the motivations behind the changes it was
experiencing.

However, there are good reasons to believe

that this concept is not as "foreign" as one might first
think.
Put simply, civil society under Gorbachev was not
a foreign concept.

It became the battle cry of the

democratic opposition in the Soviet Union.

The informal

groups that existed had overall adopted the strategy and
methodology of civil society thought.

Civil society was

seen, by opposition groups, as a political archetype
(Tismaneanu, 1990,3,182).

It was the selfselected beacon

for the opposition out of the fog of their socialist
system. This beacon was chosen because it had roots in
the Russian experience.

Reformers were drawn to the
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fledgling civil society that existed in the late 19th
century, the short lived freedom of the Zemstva (local
self-government), and the informal associations of the
dissent movement in 1960 and 1979.

Perhaps none stated

the cries of the reforms for civil society more eloquently
than Vaclav Havel:

••• the original and most important sphere of
activity, one that pre-determines all the others,
is simply an attempt to create and support the
'independent life of society' as an articulated
expression of 'living within the truth'.
(Havel, 1985,67).
Soviet reformers in particular have argued that the new
diversity caused by the pluralism of informal associations
was, " the sign of a search for a way out of the
labyrinth.'' (Starr, 1988,36). An analysis of opposition
groups under Gorbachev illustrates that the strongest
rebuttal to the argument for the "foreigness" of this
concept is that it was the vision for the grass-roots
reformers in the Soviet Union.

This thesis confronts

the question of whether this concept, perhaps not
realizable before the Gorbachev period, nonetheless
illuminates many aspects of societal change during the
Gorbachev period. The analysis will also examine the roots
of the civil society concept in Russian society with a
particular focus on the pre-Soviet and the pre-Gorbachev
USSR.

As Moshe Lewin expressed in his 1989 book, The
10

Gorbachev Phenomenon, applying the civil society model
to the USSR under Gorbachev is a novel idea for a novel
society (Lewin, 1989, 146).
It is important to realize however, that Soviet civil
society was destined to be different from Western civil
society. The culture and history of the Soviet Union have
determined the shape and nature of its civil society.
However, to throw the concept out because of its Western
orgins is to forget that although the structures in Soviet
civil society might be different than those in the West
their function will be similar (Starr, 1988,36).
For purposes of this thesis the civil society model
shall be used to designate a political system where
government and society are distinct from one another.
The autonomy of society is protected by the rule of law
which codifies a number of critical freedoms including
speech, protection of minority rights, and most
importantly, freedom of association.

The codified rights

also extend into the right to own private property.
Informal associations are a critical element of the
independent society.

These organizations allow individuals

of like minds and concerns to come together without the
interference of the state. These associations will differ,
due to their varying concerns and purposes, in their amount
of political activity.
The status of civil society was fluid in the Soviet
11

Union in 1990.

Many believed that Soviet society had

moved into a new era and that prospects for the future
growth of civil society were good (Lewin, 1989,147).
However, regardless of prospects for its future growth
in 1989, it had already become an important component
of the political landscape in the Soviet Union.

The body

of this paper will analyze the origins, growth, and
importance of informal associations as an expression of
an awakening of civil society.
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CHAPTER II
ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
CIVIL SOCIETY AND INFORMAL ASSOCIATIONS
IN RUSSIA
To understand the importance of democratic reforms'
occuring under Gorbachev, it is necessary to examine the
historical development of civil society and informal
associations and their interaction with the state.

This

analysis of the origins and evolution of civil society
in the Soviet Union is justified for a number of reasons.
First, to appreciate fully the revolutionary nature of
the changes that occurred under Gorbachev it is necessary
to see the contrast between this era and others. Only
when this contrast is provided, can the reforms nature
be truly appreciated.

Second, the focus on origins is

justified because it helps to illustrate segments of the
past which may be "usable" for modern day reformers.
This concept of "usable" past signifies an attempt by
reformers to find a historical base for their action.
Put simply, it is an attempt to solidify reforms by showing
their historical roots.

This attempt gained great momentum

under Gorbachev and thus deserves analysis.

Last, it

is necessary to examine the origins of civil society and
its development in the Russian/Soviet state to fully
analyze a nagging question about the civil society model:
are the model, and its values, "foreign" to Soviet society?
13

Only by examining the history of civil society is it
possible to determine whether if the model is too "foreign"
to be applicable to the Soviet experience.

The analysis

of the origins and development of civil society in the
Soviet Union will focus on civil society in late Imperial
Russia, its fate under Lenin, with a particular emphasis
on the state's retreat during NEP, Stalin's totalitarianism
and its effects, and the growth and importance of the
dissident movement for civil soceity.

Civil Society in Imperial Russia

Civil society and informal associations have had
an important and tumultuous history in Russia.

This

history is young, starting really only at the end of the
19th century. The purpose of this section of the paper
will be to examine the origins of the nascent civil society
which developed at the end of the nineteenth century before
being overwhelmed by the wars, revolutions, and economic
hardship that beset Russia before the October Revolution.
The analysis of origins of the forming civil society in
Pre-Soviet Russia will focus on the state, and the changing
nature of society in the early 1900's, including its rising
professionalization, informal associations, urbanization,
and the important development of local self-government
through the zemstva.
14

The Nature of the Russian Autocratic
State
The Russian state historically has been the central
institution in Russian society.

The role of the Russian

state was determined in part by the natural characteristics
of the territory over which it presided.

The climate,

with its great temperature extremes, the area's limited
agricultural potential, and the lack of warm water ports,
created a society that struggled to survive in conditions
of scarcity (Gleason, 1991,15).

Under these conditions,

society did not have the luxury of worrying about matters
other than those of survival. The state assumed the role
of provider, although sometimes an inept one, of needed
services.
The size of the Russian territory has also been
pointed to as another reason for the far-reaching nature
of the Russian autocratic state.

The land mass over which

it had to preside was so large that many of its leaders
felt that only autocratic rule could hold the empire
together.

Catherine the Great, in her Instructions to

the Legislative Commission, used this argument as
justification for the absolute power of the sovereign.
As Catherine noted:

15

The Sovereign is absolute; for there is no other
Authority but that which centers in his single Person,
that can act with a Vigour proportionate to the Extent
of such a vast Dominion.
In the view of this monarch, any other form of government
would have ruined the empire. (Riha, 1964,253).

The size

of the empire thus provided autocratic leaders with a
strong argument for the continuation of the dominance
of the power of the state.
These physical characteristics, along with others,
led the Russian state in the late 1800's to encompass
most areas of life.

The state was the main provider of

employment for individuals, it provided, although not
always efficiently, needed services, and was the protector
of the nation.

Where the state did not or could not

provide services, a vacuum existed, since any local,
regional, or any decentralized autonomous initatives were
disallowed.

In comparison to others, the Russian state

in the 18th and 19th century played a larger role than
its counterpart in any other society (Black, 1964,480).
This predominant role was entrenched and protected by
the autocratic czars who showed great hostility to those
things that existed outside of the direct control of the
state.

This hostility was fostered by a suspicion that

elements existing outside of the sphere of the state would
threaten its power (Monas, 1991,31 ).

This suspicion led

to the state attempting to regulate heavily the public
16

sphere.

For example, beginning in 1782, for informal

associations to exist legally, Imperial approval had to
be obtained.

This combination of government hostility

and a society which was apathetic led to a stagnant public
life (Bradley, 1991, 135).

However, this, as weil as

the nature of Russian society, was to change by the early
Twentieth Century

The Changing Nature of Russian
Society in the early Twentieth Century

Russia in the late Nineteenth Century experienced
a tremendous explosion of economic growth due largely
to the Imperial government's investment in an extensive
railroad system, foreign investment in heavy industry,
and the growth of agricultural production.

During the

1890's, the rate of economic growth in Russia was surpassed
only by Japan, the United States, and Sweden.

Along with

this economic boom, Russia was experiencing rapid
urbanization. Within the last 50 years of the empire,
the urban population grew from around seven million to
over twenty million (Black, 1964, 488-489). These
conditions helped to change the nature of society and
the role of the state in Russia.
Between 1890 and 1917, Russian society grew and
changed dramatically in a variety of ways.
17

Of particular

importance to this analysis is the growth of merchants
and entrepreneurs. The merchant class, which had previously
dwindled, grew as newcomers, ranging from nobility to
trading peasants, joined. A small, but important, new
class of entrepreneurs developed. This group, and their
support of the arts, was important in sparking the cultural
growth referred to by Russian social historians as the
Silver Age.

The great advancement of Russian culture

during this short period of time spanned the arts,
medicine, science, mathematics, and engineering (Monas,
1991, 32,35).

This cultural flowering was also accompanied

by new ideas in society about its role in the state.
Russian society began to see itself as different
and separate from the state.

The Russian term used to

describe this idea is obshchestvennost, which came to
be understood as describing society's realization that
the Russian nation and state were separate entities.
However, this realization was never embodied in a class,
but rather existed as a largely informal understanding
about the nature of society (Kassow, West, & Clowes, 1991,
4).

This view of the society as separate and distinct

from the state was a prerequisite for the forming of any
type of civil society in Russia.

With this new conception

of society, individuals began to act outside of the sphere
of state control by forming and joining informal
associations.

The growth of these organizations was rapid
18

and unprecedented. By 1912, the Moscow City Directory
listed over 600 different associations with interests
ranging from sports to education. The directory is an
appropriate source to use for evidence about informal
associations in 1912 for two reasons:

(1) The directory

is one of the only governmental documents that provides
quantitative data on informal associations in 1912.

(2)

The number of informal associations listed in the
directory, 600, has been generally accepted by social
historians as an adequate representation of these
independent groups in Moscow.

A growing work force and

urbanization, described earlier, led to a division of
labor that can be documented due to the formation of
informal associations for specific vocations (Bradley,
1991, 136-137).

Society, as well as overall culture,

truly experienced a renaissance during this period.

Why

did this occur?
A number of conditions joined together to create
the unique environment which allowed the Russian Silver
Age to occur.

These conditions were political,

social-economic, and cultural in nature. Politically,
the state had legitimized the operation of nongovernmental
associations through the Great Reforms which allowed the
zemstvo, which will be described in detail later, to act
autonomously in the public sphere.

Also, power during

this time was decentralized from the autocrat to
19

ministries. For example, although approval from authorities
was still necessary for informal associations to be legal
it devolved to a number of ministries (Bradley,
1991,139-140).

The state had surrendered its monopoly

on power, allowing society to come alive in the vacuum.
Society was ready to come alive due to the social
changes it had experienced during the late Nineteenth
Century, most importantly the increased level of economic
growth and increased urbanization.

The wealth generated

during this period, along with the tremendous explosion
of city growth, led to rising expectations that municipal
governments simply could not meet. Since the state was
not able to meet the new demands, public associations,
legitimized already by the de-monopolization of power
by the state, stepped in (Bradley, 1991, 140).
Culturally, the great explosion of informal
association was influenced by an increased interest in
the national culture of Russia.

This interest in

indigenous culture led to a new examination of folk culture
and art.

A number of specific informal associations grew

to meet this need, such as the Society of Natural Science,
Anthropology and Ethnography and the Moscow Archaeological
Society (Bradley, 1991, 141 ).
The zemstvo, rural self government, is an important
break in the monopoly on power the state had wielded and
deserves special examination.
20

These self-governing bodies

were created as part of the Great Reforms of the 1860's
by the Zemstvo statute of 1864.

This statute created

the zemstvo, primary organ of self-government, at the
district and provincial level throughout Russia and
empowered it to manage, "local economic and welfare needs"
(Timberlake, 1991 ,165-166).

These self-governing rural

bodies were created by the state with the hope of forming
a bureaucratic apparatus that would make easier the
provision for the defense and welfare of the Russian people
(Porter, 1992,2). To meet their obligations, these bodies
were given the power to act independently with some state
oversight in their areas of competence, which were many
and varied (Pushkarev, 1988,52).
Due to the endemic suspicion of the state about things
that operated outside of its direct control, individual
zemstva were prohibited by law from coordinating their
activities. During periods of crisis, such as the
Russo-Turkish war, famines, or epidemic outbreaks, the
law, because of necessity, was bent to allow regional
congresses to convene.

Moves to revise the law, to allow

inter-zemstvo contacts, were met with hostility from the
government.

The Minister of Internal Affairs Viacheslav

Plehve in 1904 thought these demands treasonous as they
aspired to weaken the power of the monarch.

However,

after a direct appeal to Nicholas II by zemstvo leaders
they were allowed to form a nationwide informal
21

philanthropic organization.

But the law was not reformed

and thus contributions of manpower and material to this
organization still had to come from autonomous zemstva
(Porter, 1992, 45)
The zemstvo is of importance to society in late
Imperial Russia.

The devolution of power to rural self

government from the state was the first major break with
the monopoly on power the state historically had.

The

zemstva grew at a tremendous pace both horizontally and
vertically.

The organizations grew from 392 in 1911 at

the district and province level to over 483 by 1917
(Timberlake, 1991, 166).

By 1912, this organization that

was created to manage local economic and welfare needs
was responsible for programs that included in the rural
areas: public education, medicine and sanitation, building
and road maintenance, agricultural programs, veterinary
medicine, and philanthropic projects, to name but a few
(Pushkarev, 1988,58).
The importance of the zemstvo is not confined to
its important programs.

These organizations also helped

to change the nature of Russian society.

The zemstva

acted as the first transmission belt of urban ideals,
such as the developing middle class identity, to the rural
areas.

The development of zemestva also created new

conceptions of service. Increasingly, service in these
organizations was seen as qualitatively different from
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service to the state.

This new conception of service

led many individuals to join zemstva out of a sense of
social obligation instead of the state.

This competition

between the two organizations, along with the massive
employment of specialists by zemstva, some 70,000 by 1910,
led to an upsurge in the education and development of
specialists (Timberlake, 1991, 164-165).

Last, and

importantly, the zemstva took significant political action.
In 1879, two independent zemstva, in Tver and Chernigov,
petitioned the sovereign to allow popular representation
throughout the empire.

During the revolution of 1905,

it was a group of zemstvo leaders who made up the majority
of the historic Constitutional Democratic Party, or Kadets
(Pushkarev, 1988,53+55).

Quite simply, the leaders who

forced democratic change from the czar in 1905 were former
zemstvo members.
Russia in the early 1900's was very alive. Society
was attempting to define its existence outside of the
state, as the concept of obshchestvennost illustrates.
Informal associations, long looked at with suspicion by
the state, were allowed to flourish and grow.

This Silver

Age however, was short lived, crushed by unnecessary wars,
revolutions, and economic hardship.

However, an important

question is whether this society, before its destruction,
had become truly civil. This question is important because
reformers under Gorbachev were preoccupied with answering
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it in their search for a historical basis for democratic
iniatative in the Soviet Union.

Did Civil Society Exist in Late Imperial Russia?

An examination of society and state in Russia during
the early Twentieth Century shows that they underwent
far reaching and fundamental change.

However, was this

change enough to constitute a civil society?

In other

words, did classes exist that advocated different demands,
had a respect for the rule of law, operated outside of
the control of the state, and wanted further democratic
reform of the Russian state?

The answer to this question

can largely be found by examining the status and nature
of the "middle class" in Imperial Russia.

This class

illustrates the problems endemic to all classes within
the Russian state.

Also, this class, because of its

sensibilities and ability to solve problems of economic
productivity, has been identified as a prerequisite for
the development of any civil society (Monas, 1991,29).
In Imperial Russia, it is difficult to define any
"middle class" for a number of reasons.

First, it is

difficult to define what a "middle class" would be in
the Russian experience.

Historically, there has been

no middle class in Russia.
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Rather, there have been groups

which some have termed "middling."

Second, it is difficult

to define middle classes generally because of what has
been called the paradox of middle class formation.
According to Stuart Blumin, who analyzed the formation
of the middle class in the United States, the difficulty
is centered around the nature of the middle class which
due to its focus on individuality is highly fragmented
(Kassow, West, & Clowes, 1991, 3,4-5).

With these

difficulties in mind, and the lack of easily accessible
social statistics about class in late Imperial Russia,
the question must be reformulated. Although it would be
difficult to define the exact nature of a middle class
in Russia, it is possible to examine whether there was
a middle class identity held by members of society.
If the primary criterion used to gauge the existence
of a middle class is based on political action then it
can be definitively answered that one did not exist.
But, if the criterion used is not action, but society's
attitudes about individual initative, the role of the
state and the rule of law, another answer arises (Kassow,
1991, 367).

Russian society, in the early 1900's, came

to see itself in a fundamentally new way.

Through concepts

such as obshchestvennost, society was creating a truly
public sphere independent of the state.

Critical in the

formation of new attitudes about the state and individual
initiative were informal associations. These associations
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served in late Imperial Russia to act as transmission
belts introducing to segments of Russian society what
are traditionally thought of as middle class sensibilities.
Along with this, informal associations were creating an
atmosphere conducive to the increased professionalization
of the work force, another element necessary for the
creation of a middle class.

In the late days of Imperial

Russia, these middling elements created a grouping that,
while fragmented, was aspiring to democratic liberties
(Bradley, 1991, 146-7).
However, these common attitudes never led to the
formation of a middle class in Russia due to the middling
elements' lack of cohesion.

Quite simply, there was never

any coordinated action by these groups (Kassow, 1991,367).
Attempts to unify the middle around a common ideology
also failed.

For example, the call for the creation of

a new bourgiese middle class advocated by an informal
entrepreneurial association called the Riabushinsky circle,
fell on hostile or deaf ears in society (West,
1991,148-150).

The groups which existed in the middle

of society in late Imperial Russia embraced an ideology
that was based on individualism producing a "class" that
was as fragmented as it was unified.

Many factors led

to this fragmentation such as institutional, gender, and
occupational rivalries, competing regional economic
interests, and ethnic conflicts (Wagner, 1991, 150 & Owen,
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1991,80-81).

An examination of the impact of societal change in
the early Twentieth Century in Russia results in some
interesting and important conclusions.

First, although

society was going through a period of great change, an
articulate middle class never emerged.

However, through

the growth of informal associations, and other social
changes such as increased urbanization and division of
labor in the work force, middle class attitudes did
develop. These attitudes, held by fragmented middling
groups, were democratic and supported the idea of civil
society.

Even without a middle class, Russia did develop

a type of embryonic civil society through the growth of
"civilizing" informal associations that blossomed during
the cultural renaissance of the Russian Silver Age.
Unfortunately, the two wars, revolutions, and economic
chaos of late Imperial Russia never allowed the middling
groups to develop into a true class.

In the final analysis

this period may best be remembered as containing important
ideas and structures that were never given a chance to
develop fully. This period does suggest the potential
for an alternative democratic path for Russian society.
It is this idea of an alternative path of development,
indigenously developed in Imperial Russia, that makes
this period part of what one social historian has called,
"a usable past" for modern day reformers.
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Civil Society under the Bolsheviks
and NEP
Society as it had existed in the last days of Imperial
Russia was quickly overwhelmed by the revolutionary change
that occurred around it.

In the tumultuous times of the

First World War, February and October Revolutions, and
the early "War Communism" of the Bolshevik regime, society
underwent a complex and largely destructive metamorphosis.
This section of the paper will briefly examine the nature
of the Bolshevik revolution and its impacts under Lenin
on society.

In particular, the era of the New Economic

Policy will be examined to see if it provides another
segment of "usable past" for reformers moving in the
direction of civil society.
One of the main guiding forces behind the Bolshevik
seizure of power was Marxism.

The analysis of Marxism

for my purposes will be focused on the relationship of
Marxism to civil society issues.

This ideology served

as the rationale for the revolution's primary leader,
Lenin.

Due to the importance of Marxism to Lenin and

the other Bolsheviks, its nature seems to deserve further
examination.

Marx believed, as did Lenin, that the way

to end the alienation of mankind was through revolution
which would end class struggle (and class divisions) by
elevating the embodiment of labor, the proletariat, over
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the bourgeoisie.

In order to reach the new epoch in human

development, communism, private property would have to
be abolished.

In order to achieve the goals of communism,

Marx took a utilitarian view of individuals, regarding
them as means to obtain revolutionary ends (Ozinga,
1991,33).

When communism was finally reached, the state

would be unnecessary and simply wither away.

Marxism

was seen by Lenin as a plan for the wholesale change of
society (Brzezinski, 1989,7).
Marx, importantly, was hostile to the concept of
civil society.

This hostility is based on Marx's analysis

that civil society evolved directly out of the "production
and commerce" of the bourgeoisie.

According to Marx,

the primary principle of civil society was egoism, which
alienated individual men from mankind.

Marx saw civil

society as a model of the past that was in diametric
opposition to socialism.

As Marx wrote in his "Theses

on Feuerbach", published in 1888, "The standpoint of the
old materialism is "civil" society; the standpoint of
the new is human society, or socialized humanity." (Tucker,
1978, 163,50,145).

Consequently, due to Marx's views,

civil society was something to be overcome, not a model
to emulate.
Before leaving this brief discussion of Marxist
ideology as it relates to civil society, it is necessary
to examine one of Lenin's major contributions to Marxism,
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the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The dictatorship

of the proletariat, while mentioned in the writings of
Marx and Engels as a transition period between capitalism
and communism, remained before the Bolshevik revolution
largely an abstraction (Ozinga, 1991,59). Lenin, however,
took this abstraction and made it the heart of Communist
power in Soviet Russia.

Some political theorists have

gone so far as to see this as being "the linchpin of
Leninism" (Tucker, 1986,165). Lenin saw the dictatorship
of the proletariat as being the leadership of the
proletariat by the "vanguard," a small elite group that
had Marxist consciousness and would lead the working men
of the proletariat to revolution (Hazard, 1964 1 74).

In

order to obtain this goal, the dictatorship would socialize
the means of production, destroy capitalism, and ultimately
abolish old coercive institutions (Ozinga, 1991,59).
The leadership of the proletariat by a band of dedicated
Marxist revolutionaries was necessary because in Lenin's
views, the proletariat masses on their own were,
"slumbering, apathetic, hidebound, inert, and dormant"
(Lipset, 1981,115).
Lenin's view of the masses, coupled with the important
role he placed on leadership of them by the dictatorship
of the proletariat, molded his views on society.

Lenin

saw all organizations, regardless of their avowed purpose,
as a type of transmission belt to transfer revolutionary
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consciousness from the elite to the masses. Also, the
dictatorship of the proletariat, which has strong
paternalistic overtones, reflects and strengthens this
belief (Von Laue, 1971,169-170).

This dictatorial

paternalism led Lenin to want state guidance in all
relationships, even those between individuals (Hazard,
1964, 137).
This brief examination of Marxism/Leninism should
reveal the ideologies' hostility to civil society.
Marxists want to abolish private property which, as
discussed in Chapter One, is often seen as the essence
of civil society.

Marxists' antipathy towards civil

society goes even further however, since they see it as
part of the bourgeois past that must be swept away by
revolution.

Lenin's "dictatorship of the proletariat"

is also hostile to the idea of civil society in its
overwhelming concern for state guidance in all avenues
of life. The "dictatorship" would not allow for informal
associations because the masses, not having revolutionary
consciousness, would mislead each other.

Also, Lenin,

as a dedicated Marxist would not want to embrace this
vestige of the bourgeois mode of production and commerce.
Overall, the Bolshevik ideology was extremely hostile
to society as it was developing in Russia in the early
Twentieth Century.
The October Revolution, and the following civil war,
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greatly changed the face of Russia.

The examination of

these events that follows is not meant to be exhaustive,
but rather only to illustrate the overall effect of the
revolution on the embryonic civil society that existed
in late Imperial Russia. In order to accomplish this goal,
it will be necessary to examine the revolution's effect
on democratic ideals, the civil war's effect on society,
and the Bolshevik policy of War Communism.
The October Revolution, as is widely known, occurred
without much violence.

However, this fact should not

obscure the dramatic nature of change which was about
to occur.

After the Bolsheviks had concentrated power

in their hands they drove through a number of important
economic changes.

One of the most important was the

nationalization of industry.

This policy was carried

out on a case by case basis at a rather slow pace,

so

slow, that by June 1918 only five hundred large enterprises
had been nationalized (Kort, 1985,110).

However, although

the scope remained limited initially, the ultimate goal
was the elimination of private property.
The liberal and democratic principles of society
in Imperial Russia, already weakened by World War One,
were overwhelmed by the revolution and the determination
of the Bolsheviks.

Once the October Revolution had

occurred, it was assumed within society that a multiparty
socialist government would rule. The Bolsheviks however
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were not to allow this government to come to fruition.
The Bolsheviks, with Lenin at their helm, took power and
undertook actions to establish the dictatorship of the
proletariat.

In November, the Bolsheviks outlawed the

nonsocialist press, followed by the establishment of
revolutionary tribunals to dispense justice, and the arrest
of leading members of other political parties, in
particular the Kadets (Kort, 1985,103-104).

It was during

these early days of Bolshevik power that the Cheka, or
Secret Police, was created.

This organization, anointed

by Lenin as "directly exercising the dictatorship of the
proletariat," was used against enemies of the state (Lukes,
1985,110). In order to fulfill its mission the Cheka,
was able to operate outside the law (Arendt, 1968,421-2).
Many analysts point to its creation as being of fundamental
importance because it placed the state above the law
(Medvedev, 1978,5).
The final blow to democratic ideals came on January
19, 1918 when the long promised Constituent Assembly (a
popularly representative body) was dispersed by force.
Lenin himself summed up the importance of this event best:
it was, "complete and frank liquidation of the idea of
democracy by the idea of dictatorship." (Kort, 1985,111 ).
As the fledgling Bolshevik government matured, force and
terror through the use of the Cheka became the standard.
The fragile and abstract rule of law that had existed
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before the revolution quickly lost out to the brutal and
extreme practice of the Bolsheviks (Medvedev, 1978,5).
The consolidation of power and suspension of
democratic rights by the Bolsheviks largely sowed the
seeds for the civil war which was to erupt in 1918.

This

civil war between the anti-Bolshevik forces (Whites) and
the Bolsheviks (Reds) was brutal.

Neither side was able

to gain a quick victory and the war dragged on for three
bloody years.

The conditions were so bad in Russia that

the time has been likened by historians to the apocalypse,
with famine, cold, terror and disease running rampant
over the land.

Under these crisis conditions, the

Bolshevik government began to rely even more heavily on
terror and force.

The Cheka which had been used sparingly

before was unleashed on the population as a whole.

By

1921, only three years after the creation of the Cheka,
the new secret police had killed far more individuals
than the former Tsarist secret police, not previously
known for their restraint, had in a century (Kort,
1985,115,118-119).
The fragile society which had existed before World
War I, the revolution, and subsequent civil war, was
destroyed. At least two million men were killed during
the Russian involvement in World War One from 1914 to
1917, 3.5 million more perished under the Bolsheviks,
with the famine of 1921-22 adding tens of thousands more
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to the death toll.

The economic power that Russia had

wielded evaporated, with its gross national income falling
more than sixty percent between 1913 and 1921. These
economic hardships were accompanied by dramatic decreases
in the productivity of Russian industry.

For example,

in 1924, only eleven tractors were produced nationwide.
Last, and critically, the professionals that had existed
before the revolution were absent from the social fabric
that could be drawn on to rebuild society (Rosenberg,
1991,4-6).

Moshe Lewin noted that the civil war had,

"wiped out many of the advanced social, cultural, and
economic sectors of Tsarist Russia." (1989,16)
One of the most important aspects of the civil war
was the creation of "War Communism" by the Bolsheviks.
This term was used to designate the economic policy of
the government during the civil war from 1918-1920 and
was based on the prohibition of private trade, the forced
requisitioning of grain from rural areas, and the
centralization of economic activity (Medvedev, 1978,229).
This centralization of economic activity began on June
28, 1918 when the Bolsheviks nationalized all Russian
industry, effectively ending the notion of private
property.

War Communism also involved the conscription

of large segments of the population into compulsory labor
for the state (Kort, 1985, 120-121 ).

As has already been

mentioned, force was used increasingly during this period
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to accomplish goals, most notably the requisitioning of
grain (Medvedev, 1978,153). This model was the operating
economic plan for the Bolsheviks until it was abolished
amidst great controversy and under crisis conditions at
the Tenth Party Congress in 1921

(Kort, 1985,124).

The analysis in this section should illustrate the
events that were responsible for destroying Russian
from 1914 to 1921.

societ~

The fragile society that had existed

before the devastation of World War One, the October
Revolution and Russian Civil War, was overwhelmed by
successive crises.

Economically, the Russian people also

suffered greatly, with their production plummeting during
this time.

Private property, the hallmark of civil

society, was eliminated.

The Bolshevik state, in part

due to threats to its power, began to command and not
simply lead society.

These commands from 1918 to 1921

increasingly were enforced with violence.

Under these

circumstances, society could not develop.

Civil society

and informal associations increasingly became figments
of the past as people strove simply to survive.

36

Even with their victory in the civil war, Bolshevik
power was still not on firm moorings.

After their victory

the policy of War Communism was still raising discontent
among the rural areas and a majority of Soviet society.
At the beginning of the Tenth Party Congress, a former
military stronghold for the Bolsheviks, Kronstadt naval
base, revolted against the government.

The rebellion

was put down after yet another brutal battle but a clear
signal had been sent to the Bolshevik government.

War

Communism had not solved the problems that beset society
and without significant change the state faced more civil
conflict.

It was at this Tenth Party Congress that the

provisions of the New Economic Policy (NEP) were adopted
as a "tactical retreat" from the forced and massive march
the Bolsheviks had taken towards a socialized economy
(Kort, 1985,179).

The NEP allowed for private property

and industry, at controlled levels, to come back into
the economy.

The state during this period decreased its

use of force drastically, leading to the suspension from
1921-1929 of terror as a primary political tool (Cohen,
1985,7-6).

As state domination of societal interactions

subsided, society became more self-expressive and witnessed
something of a cultural rebirth (Van Laue, 1971,161 ).
This period of the NEP has been scrutinized as a possible
alternative existing in Leninist socialism to the
totalitarianism of Stalin (Cohen, 1985,7). However, a
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closer examination of the NEP period is necessary to
evaluate its usefulness as part of the "usable past" for
civil society.
The NEP period can best be thought of as a
transitional period.

New research has revealed that it

was during this transition that the Soviet nation was
built (Rosenberg, 1991,317).

In other words, it was during

1921-1928 that Soviet society began to take the form that
we know today.

There are a number of reasons for this.

First, after the devastation of the First World War, the
two 1917 revolutions, the civil war, and War Communism,
society was largely "declassed."

Society had been so

severely hit by the crisis that stretched from 1917 to
1921 that the idea of social classes had become meaningless
because no distinguishable ones existed.

The NEP period,

due to Bolshevik power, led to an increased importance
being put on both the social and political importance
of social class. Even during the relatively free period
of the NEP, it was still more socially and politically
advantageous to be a member of the prolerariat than of
the frowned on bourgeoisie.

Consequently, during the

early 1920's, although classes still had slippery
divisions, they began to acquire some true form
(Fitzpatrick, 1991, 11,13,25,28-29).

Second, private

trade greatly expanded during this time.

In particular,

the small trader, who had been eliminated during war
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communism by the prohibition on private trade, now
flourished.

So important was private trade under NEP

that by 1922 governmental figures estimated it to account
for eighty percent of all retail sales occurring in the
Soviet Union.

Even the socialist government was

increasingly dependent on the private traders to get their
products to society.

A 1927 study done by the Supreme

Council on the National Economy estimated that fifty
percent of consumer goods produced by the state was
reaching individuals through private trade.

It was this

growing importance of capitalist trade that led the
government in the fiscal year 1926/27 largely for political
and ideological reasons reasons once again to crack down
on private trade.

This new crackdown that grew in 1928

did not so much eliminate private trade as it forced it
underground, consequently laying the foundations for the
later black market in the Soviet Union (Ball, 1921,
90,94,96,98-99).

However, while private trade was allowed

to flourish, it helped to rebuild the economic base for
the Soviet state.

Third, due to the relative

permissiveness of the government under NEP, culture
experienced a limited rebirth.

The cultural flowering

that occurred under NEP from 1921-1929 has been likened
by a top analyst to a "Moscow Spring" for society (Cohen,
1985,75). A perceptive analyst explained a possible
rationale for why this period seems so bright when he
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wrote,

Perhaps culture during the NEP years appears to shine
so brightly because of the stark contrast with the
pitch darkness that followed under Stalin (Kort,
1985,136).
Even with the permissiveness of the state under NEP,
things were still far from being free or democratic.
In the summer of 1921, in the early days of NEP, the first
extensive political purges took place in the Soviet Union.
It was also at this time that Lenin called for "model
trials" (show trials) of political dissidents to show
enemies of the state what the punishment would be for
their treasonous activity.

The impact of the political

purges and model trials was to swell the number of
prisoners, supported dramatically by the fact that
concentration camps in Russia tripled in number from
1921-1923 (Kort, 1985,141-142,144).

Also, critically

for democracy in the Soviet Union, it was at the Tenth
Party Congress, the same party congress at which NEP was
adopted that the infamous ban on factionalism (Lukes,
1985,110).

This prohibition outlawed the creation of

differing factions within the Communist Party and applied
strict compliance and unanimous support for decisions
taken by the majority.

This limited examination of

political conditions under NEP should serve to highlight
the fact that the period was neither "free" nor
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"democratic" as thought of in the West.
It is difficult to assess the usefulness of this
period for civil society due to the conflicting currents
which occurred during the NEP period.

For example, class

structure was rebuilt, with a small but important
entrepreneurial component, private property came back
into existence, and there was some cultural freedom.
However, political dissent against the regime was not
allowed.

Governmental control of societal interactions

still occurred.

However, the NEP period is important

in that it was the nation building period of the Soviet
state.

Although the Soviet state was largely

authoritarian, it had not reached the destructive
totalitarianism of Stalin.

The possibility still existed

under NEP for Soviet society to develop in different
directions. But, with the death of Lenin, and Stalin's
destruction of NEP, this was not to be.
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The Effects of Stalinism on Informal
Associations
Josef Stalin seized power in the Soviet Union shortly
after the death of Lenin.

Stalin eliminated the policies

of the NEP and quickly sought to create a totalitarian
state.

The economic freedom which had existed under NEP

was replaced by the state dominated economy as enunciated
in the first five year economic plan by the state.

The

use of terror and force, both of which had been relaxed
during NEP, swelled under Stalin to proportions unseen
before in Soviet history.

Increasingly, the state began

to intrude into all aspects of life.

The purpose of this

section of the paper is to examine the totalitarianism
of Stalin and its effect on the formation of civil society.
This examination is necessary for a number of reasons.
First, the Soviet Union under Stalin (1929-1953) was
transformed into a totalitarian state.

The totalitarian

system was in diametric opposition to the values championed
by civil society.

In a totalitarian state there is little,

if any, room for society to act independently.

Second,

Soviet society during this period underwent profound
changes that have had lasting effects on both its nature
and its characteristics.

These changes altered society

and subsequently affected its attitudes towards informal
associations and civil society.
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Totalitarianism is a system of government in which
the state is of paramount importance.

Society in this

system does not exist to be served by government, but
rather, to serve it. One of the more precise definitions
of totalitarianism was provided by Stanislav Andreski:

Totalitarianism is the extension of permanent
governmental control over the totality of social
life ••• Totalitarianism in this sense is, of course,
an ideal type to which concrete cases can only
approximate, since no government can control
every instance of social interaction (1967,31).
This definition highlights an important fact, that the
totalitarian model is an ideal type.

In other words,

it is impossible for a government ever to control all
aspects of social life.

Thus, the term refers more

precisely to the goal of governments attempting to dominate
all aspects of social life (Buchheim, 1968,38).
Stalin made the Soviet Union into a totalitarian
system by a number of different measures.

After Lenin's

death, a collegial leadership of the Soviet Union was
to rule.

This leadership group was to be composed of

Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin (Ulam, 1989,236).

However,

before this group could come to power, Stalin was able
to consolidate his own power and take control of the state
(Bracher, 1981,13).

Regardless of whether the collegial

group would have ever truly ruled, its removal was
necessary for Stalin to construct the totalitarian state.
43

This action was necessary because totalitarian systems
are recognized for their "personal leader" who commands
the state with his ideological insight.

Thus, for Stalin

to build his system, he first had to gain personal and
sole control of the state.
One of the pre-conditions for the existence of a
totalitarian state is a society of atomized/isolated
individuals (Arendt, 1958,323).

Soviet society, during

NEP, was in a transitory stage as has already been
discussed.

Society was not isolated, but neither was

it yet unified.

Stalin, however, took grand steps to

ensure that Soviet society would never under his leadership
unify.

In order to force the atomization of society,

Stalin undertook a variety of different measures.

These

measures were aimed at destroying any "class identity"
that could exist outside of the state and threaten its
monopoly on power.
were the Soviets.

The first target for Stalin's attacks
This organization, the central element

of national representation in 1929, still played an active
role that prevented the complete domination of the state
by the Communist party.

Stalin undermined the Soviets

by introducing Bolshevik cells which alone had the power
to appoint higher functionaries to central committee
positions.

This requirement, and its success, eliminated

by 1930 any non-Bolshevik power in the Soviet state
(Arendt, 1958,320).
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After consolidating his power in the Soviet state,
Stalin turned his attack to society, in particular property
owning peasants, also known as "kulaks."

The attack

against the peasant class, which had been potentially
one of the most

powerful before the purges, was more

severe than for any other class.

Millions were killed

in the effort to "de-Kulak" the Soviet Union.

The

remaining peasants were forced into collective farms,
a form of agricultural servitude to the state.

The impact

of this push for collectivization and purge of kulaks
was to convince many individuals that their lives depended
not on what group they belonged to, but rather, on the
whims of the state (Arendt,1958,320).

Stalin succeeded

through the mass slaughter of innocent peasants in reducing
this potentially powerful group to an amalgamation of
isolated and suspicious individuals.
Even the proletariat during this time was not immune
from attack.

The introduction of the Stakhanovite work

brigades in the early 1930's fractured unity among the
working class in two ways.

First, the system broke up

worker solidarity through intense competition to obtain
ever increasing production goals.

Second, the

Stakhanovites were socially distinguished from other
workers.

Any resentment in the work place was focused

on these special workers and not on management.

The effect

of the Stakhanovite system was to displace resentment
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to specific workers and not the state.

As a last note,

even the bureaucracy of the state was not immune from
attack by Stalin.

From 1936 to 1938, almost every

administrative office in the Soviet state was ideologically
cleansed.

The results of this cleansing were a replacement

of around half of all administrative personnel and the
death of more than 8 million party members (Arendt,
1958,322).
This examination of the purges that occurred under
Stalin is not meant to be exhaustive.

Rather, this

analysis has served to highlight the methods that Stalin
used to create the atomized/isolated society the
totalitarian state demanded.

The purges further isolated

society by the method of determining guilt which was used.
Guilt during this time was not dependent on evidence,
but rather on "objective guilt."

In other words,

regardless of one's actions, one still might harbor
capitalist thoughts in one's mind and thus be guilty of
treason against the state.

Social ties were further

fragmented during this time by the use of "guilt by
association."

This type of "guilt" meant that as soon

as one person was arrested all of his associates were
also suspect.

In order for the associates to prove that

they were not guilty also, they were often coerced into
turning against their former friends to save their own
lives.

The effect of this "guilt by association" was
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to make members of society extremely cautious and
suspicious about forming any ties with one another.

It

is this method of guilt, so perfected by Stalin, that
was one of the most powerful forces in creating the
atmosphere of suspicion that permeated Stalin's state
(Arendt,1958,323).
Soviet society under Stalin underwent a great process
of social change.

Within the first decade of his

leadership, Stalin was able to transform society through
draconian measures from a mostly backwards rural entity
into an increasingly industrial, urban, and literate
populace.

This transformation was accomplished through

the collectivization of agriculture and heavy
industrialization (Cohen, 1985,94,56).

The first five

year plan attempted to integrate all aspects and resources
of the Soviet state to accomplish its goals.
Industrialization was of pre-eminent importance to Stalin;
some eighty percent of all investments in the first plan
were designed to obtain this goal.

As industrialization

proceeded, the numbers of workers rose dramatically, from
eleven million in 1928 to thirty eight million by 1933
(D'Encausse, 1981,21-22). Soviet society during this
period, due to increased employment opportunities in the
cities and rural flight caused by collectivization, became
increasingly urban.

Within a decade, some 27 million

Soviets moved from rural areas to the cities (Lewin,
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1985,22).

The great industrialization of the Soviet Union

was not without its costs.

As has already been discussed,

the human toll was great, an estimated 10 million died
at Stalin's hand.

The economic toll on society was also

great, from 1929 to 1932 the Soviet standard of living
fell almost forty percent, bringing the economy to the
same crisis levels it had been at before the end of War
Communism (D'Encausse,1981,23).

Collectivization had

severely wounded agricultural production; output levels
had fallen to lows reminiscent of the tsarist period
(Lewin, 1989,101).

Society, not the state, endured the

hardships of the transformation into a modern entity.
The impact of Stalinism on informal associations
and on Soviet society is far reaching and important.
The totalitarian system that Stalin developed destroyed
the basis for informal associations in the Soviet Union
from 1929-1953.

The state was so completely involved

in social life that freedom of association was severely
limited (Buchheim, 1968,15).

The totalitarian system

was in opposition to any type of group existing outside
of its direct control.

To ensure that no classes could

develop which could articulate demands on the state, Stalin
constantly purged society.

Consequently, the memberships

of groups was constantly changing as members were simply
liquidated.

It was these purges, and their "guilt by

association" methods, that in large part fragmented Soviet

48

society.

This fragmentation was accompanied by furious

collectivization and industrialization that increased
the havoc in the Soviet system.

Moshe Lewin has

characterized society during this time, due to its state
of flux and anomie, as a "quicksand society." (Lewin,
1989,22)

This "quicksand" did not provide any solid

foundation on which to build civil society or informal
associations.
Soviet society also experienced great social changes
during the leadership of Stalin.

Economically, society

was rushed into industrialization and the collectivization
of agriculture. Industrialization and collectivization
did transform the Soviet Union into a modern nation but
at a horrific, and likely unnecessary, high cost.

With

millions dead from Stalin's leadership and World War II,
society was largely depopulated. The remaining population
was no longer predominantly rural, but increasingly urban.
The economy lay in ruin from the disastrous policies of
Stalin and the war.

Society, while advanced from earlier

stages, was not prepared to challenge the power of Stalin's
state.
Overall, during this period Soviet society experienced
a number of lasting changes that would affect the formation
of attitudes towards civil society.
increasingly modern and urban.

First, society became

The urbanization of Soviet

society is important, as will be discussed in the next
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chapter in detail, because it fosters attitudes of
individuality.

Second, society was scared by Stalin's

totalitarianism.

One of the manifestations of this scaring

was an endemic suspicion towards forming groups outside
of state control.

Individuals were afraid to act outside

of the state for fear of punishment. "Guilt by association"
tactics led to a society that was distrustful of it
members.

Although this condition was not permanent, it

was a definite obstacle to the unification of various
individuals and groups in society.

Last, the totalitarian

system established by Stalin did not disappear with his
demise.

Rather, attempts to move away from totalitarianism

and towards. democracy had to be accomplished by dismantling
the system he had built.
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The Rise and Importance to Civil Society of the
Dissident Movement

After the death of Stalin, society began slowly to
rebuild itself.

This rebuilding occurred in an atmosphere

of relative freedom under Khrushchev's leadership.

In

the intellectual sphere, society was allowed far greater
freedom than it had been given during Stalin's days.
This freedom was in part spawned by Khrushchev's secret
speech to the Twentieth Communist Party Congress where
the crimes of Stalin were first officially recognized.
The questioning of the actions of the state in the past
by Khrushchev motivated others in society to re-examine
and criticize the past also.

However, there were limits

to what was permissible to discuss as members of society
who pushed too far soon discovered.

The intellectual

freedom of Khruschev's leadership quickly disappeared
during the invasion of Hungary in 1956. The "thaw" that
had begun was quickly refrozen by harsh measures
(Rubenstein, 1985,4-5,10).

The importance of the thaw

was best summed up by the American poet and historian
Peter Viereck who wrote of the period:

"An intellectual

revolt, a revolt of the heart? Yes. Political freedom?
Hardly." (Brumberg, 1970,5)

The intellectual revolt was

important, however, because for the first time since
Stalin's days segments of society had begun to think and
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speak openly about their ideas.
The thoughts of society were quickly turned into
action under the Brezhnev regime when the dissident
movement was born. The catalytic event causing the
formation of the first dissent group was the "show trial"
of the two authors Sinyavsky and Daniel (Kowalewski,
1980,7).

A segment of the intellectual community protested

the trial of the two authors as a sham and decried the
new attempt by the regime to limit intellectual freedom.
The regime's response to the protest was to arrest anyone
who had associated with the protesters and the protesters
themselves (Fireside,1980,39).
step had been taken.

However, an important

No longer was society willing to

murmur its discontent in private. Rather, the intellectual
community was prepared to struggle for a legal movement
that would operate in the full and open view of the
authorities.

This trial was the spark that ignited the

minds and passions of what was to become the dissident
movement (Medvedev, 1984,97).

This section of the thesis

will examine the dissident movement's characteristics,
response by the Soviet government, and importance to civil
society and informal associations.
Members of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union
were drawn primarily from the intelligentsia of society
(Kowalewski, 1980,18).

The intelligentsia is composed

of professionals in all fields who are active in society
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and are widely acknowledged as cultural, intellectual,
and moral leaders.

In his statistical analysis of the

dissent movement from 1965-1978, David Kowalewski noted
a trend in the dissent movement towards a slightly
increased intellectualization of its members (1980,18).
The dissidents were involved in dissent groups because
they held a moral commitment to improving the system they
lived in.

This commitment was often lifelong since the

label of dissident was not easily removed once given by
the government. In other words, in the state's eyes, "once
a dissident, always a dissident." (Fireside, 1980,34+43).
David Kowalewski's analysis of statistical trends
in the human rights protest movement from 1965 to 1978
allows an interesting portrait of dissent in the Soviet
Union to be drawn. Most of the members of the dissident
movement that engaged in active protest were under thirty
years of age.

The individuals were primarily from the

intelligentsia, as has already been mentioned.

Most

demonstrations by groups, during this time, involved
between 50 and 150 people.

The frequency of protest

fluctuated depending on a number of variables,
repression/thaws, but was centered in urban areas and
averaged around 42 demonstrations a year
(1980,19-20,18,15).

This urbanization of protest was

to be expected since demonstrations in the cities would
draw greater attention, both world wide and nationally,
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than those in the rural areas.
The types of groups which fall under the category
of dissident groups are varied.

They include religious,

national, professional, social, political, cultural, and
humanitarian groups.

All of these groups share in common

their operation outside of state control.

The motivation

behind the creation of most of these groups had been to
address and attempt to cure injustices in Soviet society
(Reddaway, 1983,15).

A content analysis of their self

published literature, called samizdat in Russian, reveals
a focus on the arbitrariness of state rule, police
repression, and calls for an increase in the rule of law
(Bromberg, 1970,10).

Importantly, dissidents were

attempting to change the system from within, not attempting
to create a new system.

This distinction is important

because it distinguishes their movement from being
revolutionary in nature (Fireside, 1980,40).
Dissent groups were unified by their deep respect
for human rights and freedom.

The Universal Declaration

of Human Rights passed by the United Nations in 1948 became
one of the most important documents for the dissent
movement.

In 1975, the Soviet Union, by signing the Final

Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation, legally
obligated itself to honor this declaration.

Specific

human rights watchdog groups, known as Helsinki Groups,
were formed by the intelligentsia around the Soviet Union
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to monitor regime compliance with the treaty. The treaty
·had a twofold importance to the dissidents.

First, the

document unified groups around a core set of values and
beliefs.

Second, it justified dissidents' right to act

independently of the state without harassment.

Thus,

it served as an important tool for legitimizing the
.existence of various groups (Kowalewski, 1980,57).
The intelligentsia composition of the dissident
movement fostered a lack of support for the movement from
workers in Soviet society.

This lack of support occurred

in part because of anti-individualist, and
anti-intelligentsia beliefs among workers (Fireside,
1980,39).

The anti-intelligentsia bias was based on

hostility directed towards the class due to its privileges
(Rubenstein, 1985,322).

On top of the negative beliefs

of workers towards the intelligentsia, support for dissent
was limited further by strong police regulation of
dissident groups and political propaganda directed against
them (Reddaway, 1983,14).

The composition of the dissident

movement was also of some benefit.

The most important

effect of the composition of the movement was that the
high status of individuals involved made it difficult
to suppress.

The state at times was hesitant to crackdown

on dissent because it needed the active support of the
intelligentsia, as a class, for its own plans to succeed.
Lastly, the schism between the workers and dissidents
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may have been largely artificial.

Roy Medvedev noted

that the heart of the dissidents' message had strong appeal
not only throughout the intelligentsia, but also with
blue collar workers.

However, the state attempted to

limit the meeting of the two audiences, intelligentsia
dissidents and workers, for fear of the power of the two
groups combined (Medvedev, 1984,98,100).

The regime thus

had a vested interest in attempting to emphasize, and
if possible widen the gap between the two classes.
As the dissident movement aged it grew more unified.
Evidence of the increased cohesion of the movement could
be seen in increased verbal and financial support between
groups, and individual joint membership in a number of
groups. Three reasons have been pointed to for the
increased unity of Soviet dissident groups:

(1) All groups

were unified around a core set of beliefs embodied in
the United Nations Declaration on Universal Human Rights;
(2) All dissident groups shared a commmon enemy, the state;
and (3) A subculture of dissent was built in gulags among
political prisoners (Kowalewski, 1980,24+26).

However,

even this unity among dissidents was not enough ultimately
to defend these groups from the power of the state.
The state's reaction to the dissident movement, after
the trial of Daniel/Sinyavsky and arrest of dissidents
who had protested at the trial, consisted primarily of
ignoring the dissent movement.
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The state rejected or

ignored most of the specific demands that groups advocated.
The rationale behind not engaging in a dialogue with the
groups was to deny them legitimacy.

In the eyes of the

state, since these groups worked outside of official
guidelines, they could not possibly be "legitimate"
spokesmen for Soviet society (Reddaway, 1983,23). However,
this passive toleration of dissent did not last for long.
The Soviet state suppressed dissidents in an almost
cyclical manner.

The worst years for suppression of

dissent were 1972, 1976, and the breaking of the dissent
movement in 1979.

The cycle of action and reaction between

the state and the dissident movement was summed up by
Alan Brumberg who wrote:

For it is the regime that is unwilling to "draw the
appropriate conclusions": that discontent breeds
restictiveness; that restrictiveness creates "alarm";
and that alarm leads to reprisals-and thus to more
restrictiveness, defiance, and dissent-a story as
old as Russia itself (1970,13).
The analysis that follows will be focused on the patterns
of regime reaction to dissent that occurred under
Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov/Chernenko.

This analysis

will serve to highlight the tone of acceptance/rejection
of dissent that occurred under each leader.
As has already been mentioned, the intellectual birth
of the dissident movement occurred during the "thaw" in
state control during Khrushchev's rule.
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This "thaw"

was not long lived, and was followed up by repressive
measures taken against dissidents after the Soviet invasion
of Hungary.

However, Khrushchev had a crucial role in

creating conditions that would be conducive to active
dissent under Brezhenev.

The most important action that

Khrushchev took in this regard was his speech to the
Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 regarding the crimes
of Stalin.

Although this speech did not detail, or admit,

most of the crimes Stalin committed against the Soviet
people, it did signal an attempt by the state to distance
itself from the totalitarian policies of the past.

The

re-examination of the past that Khrushchev began set lose
political, social, cultural, and judicial forces·that
he could not control (Rothberg, 1972,5-6).

These forces

sought to ensure that the power of the state would never
again reach the levels of control that it did during
Stalin's day.

The groups were also important in

establishing the boundaries of what was safe to critically
examine under Khrushchev.
Khrushchev also affected the dissident movement by
his reform of Soviet criminal law. Under Khrushchev's
leadership, the Soviet legal system was substantially
modified. Critical changes included a decrease in the
use of the death penalty, decreases in the maximum sentence
permissible for many crimes, and reductions in the
authority and power of the KGB.
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One of the most important

changes was the creation of a new legal rule that stated
that only a court could find individuals guilty of crimes,
or subject them to punishment •

Previous to this new

law, Soviet citizens could be found guilty of crimes and
punished without ever having a trial in a court of justice
(Rubenstein, 1985,23).

The effect of these changes was

to encourage the intellectual community to become even
more independent of the state.

Khrushchev's tenure as

leader of the Soviet state can best be remembered as being
a period of relative permissiveness.

It was during the

reforms of Khrushchev that society again began to find
its voice.

This vocalization of demands was to turn to

action under the Brezhnev regime and greater repression
by the state.
The Brezhnev regime realized that it was necessary
for the Soviet state to revitalize society, but believed
this could be done without fundamentally altering the
nature of the relationship between state and society.
Important in Brezhnev's plans to reinvigorate society
was keeping the "anti-offical" ideas of the dissent
movement from infecting Soviet society (Breslauer,
1982,176).

He believed that the campaign against dissent

should be vigorously waged.

In his own words, defending

society from the dissidents was a "sacred duty."
(Parchomenko, 1986,170)
Brezhnev did not rely on the overwhelming terror
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and repression that Stalin had used so effectively.
Rather, he relied on selective intimidation of key
dissident groups and individuals.

The rationale for this

selective intimidation was that the arrests of key sections
of the dissident movement would frighten others into
inaction (Fireside, 1980,36+39). The greatest periods
of selective intimidation occurred in 1972, 1976, and
1979 under Brezhnev; but, during two peaks of repression
by the Soviet state, in 1972 and 1976, the regime retreated
in its coercive tactics against dissidents in the face
of international humanitarian pressure.

Up until 1979

all of the actions taken by the government against the
dissident movement had been relatively limited.

However,

this policy was to change with the wave of crackdowns
that occurred in 1979.

In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan and world attention was shifted away from
human rights in the Soviet Union.

Incidentialy, it was

during this year that the Soviet Union decided to
effectively eliminate dissident groups.

The new coercion

by the state resulted in a doubling of the arrest rates
of dissidents, increases in the length of their sentences,
and an increasing reliance on the use of physical violence
against them. This new wave of attacks on dissident
movements effectively eliminated organized dissent.

By

1980, all of the former dissident groups operating above
ground were destroyed, had gone underground, or were simply
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silent.

The success of the regime's policy was so great

that by 1983 only one dissident group operated above ground
in the Soviet Union (Reddaway, 1983,1013).

Even the

Helsinki monitoring groups, which had survived earlier
suppression by the state were overwhelmed by the 1979
crackdown (Medvedev, 1984,98).

The independent voice

of society had been once again gagged by the state.
Brezhnev and his policies of selective intimidation had
prevailed over society and had succeed in creating an
atmosphere of repression reminiscent of Stalin (Brumberg,
1970,13).
The Andropov (1982-84) and Chernenko (1984-85) regimes
were thus in a position of only having to keep dissident
groups from reappearing.

The back of the movement had

already been broken by the policies of Brezhnev.

Andropov,

in particular, was not content to rest on the laurels
of the past, and moved to harass dissident groups in new
ways.

The KGB began to broaden its policy of repression

by arresting not only individuals involved in the dissident
movement, but also, those who read its literature
(Rubenstein, 1985,329).

A long awaited amnesty for

prisoners of the Soviet state was expected to occur in
1983 during the Soviet Union's sixth anniversary.

This

amnesty many expected would release dissidents and give
the dissent movement a new surge. However, Andropov did
not extend amnesty to any political prisoner, not even
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those with relatively small sentences, or to religious
dissidents.

Instead, the Soviet state kept amnesty from

this group as it did for skyjackers and murderers.

The

message being sent by Andropov was clear: dissent was
not acceptable and would not be tolerated (Medvedev,
1984,101 ). This pattern of nonacceptance of dissent was
continued under Chernenko.

Under his leadership, human

rights abuse in the Soviet Union continued to worsen
(Rubenstein, 1985,3236-7).
One of the effects of the increased repression by
the state started under Brezhenev and extending into
Andropov and Chernenko's regimes, was to strengthen the
power and status of the KGB (secret police).

A number

of candiate members of the Politburo who had worked for
the KGB were elevated to the status of full member under
Andropov.

The composition of the Politburo under Andropov

had more representation of the secret police than ever
before in the history of the Soviet state. This new status
for the KGB further served to entrench the state's
hostility to dissent and hardened its repressive
tendencies.

Chernenko was to continue on this course

of increasing the status of the KGB by giving, for the
first time since the death of Stalin, the title of Marshal
to a chairman of the KGB (Rubenstein, 1985,330).
The Soviet state has consistently, under various
leaders, been hostile to the dissent movement.
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This

hostility was based on the operation of these groups
outside of direct state control. The coercion and
harassment by the Soviet state, launched with a vigor
in 1979, was enough to decimate most dissident groups.
However, it did not completely destroy these groups but
rather drove many of them deep underground.

These groups

continued to operate because their concerns were based
on true problems in Soviet society.

The state suppressed

the dissidents but the problems they addressed went
unsolved and consequently new groups and individuals
continued the battle.

Even with the crackdown on dissent

and subsequent damage to the movement dissident groups
still assisted the growth of civil society in the Soviet
Union, as will be examined next.
The dissent movement and the various informal groups
of which it was composed were a response by the
intelligentsia to the forced social atomism that occurred
under Stalin. The groups attempted to halt the social
atomism that had occurred by rebuilding social ties outside
of the reach of the state. To protect these new social
ties the dissident movement asserted two fundamental
rights: freedom of association and freedom of expression
(Reddaway, 1983,1+5).

The dissidents personally defined

limits around their lives so portions of them could be
kept from the state's control.

In this self-definition,

society was trying to establish for itself yet another
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fundamental right, the right to be left alone (Fireside,
1980,32-33).
Apart from specific rights being demanded by the
dissident movement, dissent in and of itself, was an
elementary freedom. Hannah Arendt, the well known analyst
of totalitarian systems, explained the underlying
importance of dissent when she wrote:

The point is simply and singly whether I can say
and print what I wish, or whether I cannot; whether
my neighbors spy on me or don't. Freedom always
implies freedom of dissent. (Fireside, 1980,33)
The underlying demand of the dissent movement was freedom.
By demanding freedom in various forms, the movement was
able, for a short time, to voice its concerns and insight
into problems facing the Soviet nation.

This voice,

although muzzled quickly by the Soviet state, was able
to break the monopoly that the state had exercised on
ideas about the future of the peoples of Soviet Union
(Medvedev, 1984,98).

By acting outside of the state,

and constructing various solutions to problems facing
the nation, the dissident movement was beginning to sow
the seeds for future political opposition (Reddaway,
1983,15).

These seeds were to bloom into real political

opposition under Gorbachev as will be examined in the
next chapter of this paper.
The founders of interest group analysis of Communist
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political systems have noted another important role of
dissent. The dissent movement, by advocating various
demands and attempting to pressure the state to accommodate
them, was engaging in activities that approximate the
role played by interest groups in democratic societies.
Almost all dissident groups in the Soviet Union were formed
for the "defense of specific or more general interests."
However, these "interests" were not allowed to voice their
demands to the state without fear of harassment or
imprisonment.

The impact of this repression by the state

on these "interests" was to push the dissidents out of
the system and thus transform what was originally
intra-structural dissent into extra-structural criticism.
This extra-structural dissent, caused in large part because
of the response of the regime, served further to undermine
the state's power (Skilling,1983,23-24).
The ideas advanced by the dissent movement are also
important to the future growth of civil society and
informal associations in the Soviet Union.

Andrei Sakharov

served in large part as the moral beacon of the dissent
movement from the mid 1970's until his death.

Sakharov

was overwhelmingly concerned with bettering the conditions
for society.

However, unlike many dissidents who took

only negative action-that is pointing out problems,
Sakharov took positive steps to suggest remedies.
example, in his famous Memorandum sent to Brezhnev,
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For

Sakharov suggested that democratization and liberalization
were urgently necessary in society to save the nation
from falling economically further behind the Industrial
world (1990,643).

The tone of this message and its

justification sound remarkably like those used later by
Gorbachev to launch his economic policy of perestroika.
Sakharov also advocated the use of "glasnost", public
disclosure, as a tool to reveal the fundamental nature
of the problems that beset the nation (1990,362).

This

term, and its effect on openness were critical in allowing
the growth of informal associations under Gorbachev.
However, at the most basic level Sakharov simply was a
decent individual.

This decency and its respect for each

individual was perhaps the greatest ideal of Sakharov's
and of the dissent movement as a whole.

This concept

was most eloquently explained by Sakharov himself when
in response to why he, a non-Jew, was concerned about
Jewish emigration said, "I am not supporting them as Jews,
but simply as fellow human beings.''(1990,135)
The dissent movement critically influenced the
formation of attitudes towards civil society and informal
associations. The dissidents were attempting to gain
control back over their own lives and importantly over
their associations.

These actions were pre-conditions

for the existence of any type of

civil society.

By

removing part of their life from the state's control,
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dissidents were carving out an area for informal
associations to exist in.

Indeed, the various groups

in the dissent movement were informal associations.

These

associations are important because they were the first
sign of a truly independent society since the days of
Stalin.

Although suppressed in the end by the state,

these groups showed society that it was possible to
challenge the power of the state. The importance of their
success in showing society what was possible should not
be underestimated.

The groups also are important because

they show how society could articulate its interests to
the state.

The few successes of the groups to change

policy should not overshadow their importance as a new
mechanism society had for communicating with the regime.
In the end, these groups were not destroyed, but rather,
during the "winter" of repression by the state, driven
into hibernation.
fade away.

The ideas they inspired did not simply

Instead, they were a fertile bed for new

democratization efforts.
The democratic nature and practices of the dissident
movement once again show an indigenous alternative in
society to the authoritarian state.

The movement presented

society with another path to follow, that of democratic
civil society. The dissidents, without explicitly
mentioning the term, were calling for civil society.
Their demands for a space for society outside of state
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control, for the right to associate freely, to be able
to articulate specific interests, and to be protected
by the rule of law are all the pillars of any functional
civil society.

Although these demands were largely not

granted, their desire for these rights makes the dissent
movement rich with "usable history" for future democratic
reformers.
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CHAPTER III
SOVIET SOCIETY UNDER GORBACHEV
The Soviet state by the 1980's was in a sharp decline
fostered by governmental stagnation that occurred during
the Brezhnev era.

Many Western analysts also believed

that Soviet society was in a state of malaise.

However,

while Soviet society was apathetic about political matters,
it would be a mistake to conclude that the society was
stagnant.

To mistake official stagnation for societal

stagnation would be not fully to appreciate the fact that
Soviet society by the mid-1980's was already moving in
the direction of becoming a distinct and separate entity
from the state.

The most obvious measure of the society's

quickening pulse was the surging second economy or black
market that took hold in the late 1970's and early 1980's.
In response to the lack of wanted goods and services from
the Soviet state, entrepreneurial citizens filled the
gap. The power of this "twilight economy" should not be
underestimated since data showed it to account for about
one-seventh of all non-agricultural production in the
Soviet Union.
other areas.

Also, society was active in a number of
For example, Soviet adolescents forced their

way into the global youth culture, much to the dismay
of state offficials.

Samizdat publications, self-published

writings, always a component of non-governmentally
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controlled communications, rose dramatically as society
began to define itself in the late 1970's-early 1980's.
Pockets within Soviet society, when Gorbachev ascended
to power, were not passive, but rather, very active outside
of the state (Starr, 1988,27,26).).
Society was not directing its energies in ways the
regime would have liked.

Rather than helping to build

the socialist state, society was attempting to escape
from it. The growing disenchantment with the Soviet state
was caused by many factors, not the least of which was
the stagnation of the regime itself (Lapidus, 1991, 137).
Increasingly, in the 1980's, society wanted out of the
social contract into which the Soviet state had forced
it.

The disillusionment and apathy toward politics reached

to the highest levels of society.

The lack of real

political participation for even party members had become
so great that even they were becoming apolitical.

It

was this pervasiveness of political apathy at all levels
of society that signaled to Western analysts the "crisis''
condition that the Soviet state was in (Lewin, 1989,123).
In contrast to the lack of political engagement that
Soviet society faced, it was beginning to experience the
impact of slow social changes that had been developing
for years.

These changes included:

increased

urbanization, increased literacy, and increased
communication technology.

All of these changes had
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important and far reaching effects on society and for
the future of civil society.
The process of urbanization in the Soviet Union had
been occurring since the Bolshevik revolution.

However,

its long term impacts were just beginning to be felt in
second and third generation urban dwellers in the late
1970's.

A top Soviet scholar, O.N. Ianitskii, has argued

that one of the main impacts of urbanization has been
the development of workers as individuals.

This

individualism was caused in part by the emphasis on
personal life in cities and a high degree of autonomy
within the urban family (Lewin, 1989, 64-66).

Soviet

society experienced the growth pains associated with the
shift from a rural society to an urban one.

One of the

most important side-effects of this change was the
inoculation of the ideas and the practices of individualism
within the urban populace.
The growing education level of the Soviet populace
served to further emancipate society from the state.
It created a society more critical of official propaganda
and governmental policies.

Consequently, increased

education levels were accompanied by a loss of faith in
the government's ability to manage political and societal
matters (Starr 1989,29).

The increasingly critical view

that society took regarding official propaganda reduced
the ideological pull that the state once had.
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Society

had gradually begun to see itself not as a homogeneous
whole, as official ideology prescribed, but rather, as
a heterogeneous mixture of multiple interests (Lapidus,
1990, 141 ).

This recognition of diversity was one of

the critical elements which propelled individuals to join
informal organizations that best represented their views.
Soviet society was also besieged in the 1980's by
the communications revolution that was occurring
world-wide.

The effect of this change was two fold:

(1) There was substantially easier access to outside
information as communication technology advanced.

Western

broadcasts, beamed across borders, such as the BBC, the
Voice of America, and Radio Liberty, gained a substantial
audience in the Soviet Union.

Radio Liberty estimates

for the late 1970's indicated that around 67.3 million
adults, or about 37 percent of Soviet adults, listened
to foreign broadcasts yearly (Benn,1992, 63).

This

increased information from foreign sources further
discredited governmental propaganda in the eyes of an
increasingly cynical Soviet society (Lewin, 1989,71);
(2) The advancement of communications technology allowed
for communication between individuals and groups that
was difficult for the state to control.

For example,

tape recorders, never subject to official regulations,
led to the dissemination of "dissident" music and speeches.
So large was the influence of this device that by 1985,
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Soviet surveys were showing that around 63 percent of
adolescents were making musical recordings for themselves
(Benn, 1992,35-36). Videotape recorders and personal
computers, although more regulated than tape recorders,
also opened other avenues for communication beyond state
oversight.

This enhanced communications ability allowed

groups increasingly to network themselves, thus increasing
their power and resources (Starr 1988, 33).

These

technical changes added mechanisms for society to
communicate with itself without the interference of the
state.
The last change that affected Soviet society was
its growing population.

Although population growth is

a normal phenomenon in societies, it has had particular
consequences for the Soviet system.

The Soviet state

had attempted to control almost every aspect of the
individual's life.

However, with the increasing population

this task became impossible.

The level of control for

which the state has striven is impossible in modern
societies.

Also, in the post-Stalinist period, the

political will to use terror as a primary instrument for
societial control greatly diminished.

Consequently, due

to the decreased fear of surveillance and regimentation,
fear as a mechanism for societal control was not as strong
as it once had been (Starr, 1988, 30).
Gorbachev faced a society unlike any that his
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predecessors had faced.

While withdrawing from official

matters and becoming increasingly apathetic at all levels
about politics, society was fermenting in areas out of
the state's control.

Many of these long-term changes

were being expressed in new realizations about society
and the individual.

These changes coupled with the impact

of technological change produced a society that
increasingly threatened to take the initiative out of
the Party and put it into the hands of the people (Petro,
1991, 128). Society was changing and beginning to feel
the pressures of dragging the decaying Soviet state into
the twenty-first century. This was the situation into
which Gorbachev stepped and within which his reforms were
conceived and tried.

It is important to realize that

he was not, as Frederick Starr noted, "creating change
so much as uncorking it." (1988,27).

What was Gorbachev's Position Towards the Core of
the Civil Society Movement, the Informal Groups?

Gorbachev's position toward informal groups evolved
as the political atmosphere within which he was operating
changed. Initially, Gorbachev and top Soviet leaders were
extremely cautious about experimenting to bring about
civil society.

They were neither sure that civil society
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was what they wanted, nor that it was the best mechanism
to transform Soviet society (Tarasulo, 1992,6).
Originally, Gorbachev's changes were aimed at simply
starting the economic engine of the Soviet Union again.
Glasnost, or openness, was to be used primarily as a
mechanism to accelerate the economy by a process of
"criticism and self-criticism" (Benn, 1992,12).

However,

it soon became obvious that this action would not be enough
since society wanted real reform.

Thus, as early as 1986,

glasnost began to be seen in a broader sense, as a way
to transform the political system of the Soviet Union.
It was at this time that Gorbachev's perestroika, or
restructuring, began to apply equally to aspects of social
life.

Perstroika than signified that deeper, even

fundamental, changes would have to be made for the Soviet
Union to reform.

During the early phase of glasnost and

perestroika, governmental policy was still focused on
expanding officially organized groups (Kerblay, 1989,95).
This policy was simply an extension of official policy
as it had existed since the Stalinist era.

Informal

groups, in Russia, were tethered to the state by a 1932
RFSFR law that permitted informal groups as long as they
had a sponsoring governmental institution (Hosking,
1990,64).

The effect of the law was to allow informal

organizations in name only.
As the extent of glasnost and perestroika began to
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expand in the late 1980's, Gorbachev took a more lenient
view of informal organizations.

This official

permissiveness allowed informals to exist without being
tethered to official organizations.

However, Gorbachev

still clearly did not want informal groups to threaten
the Party and thus allowed reduced, but still persistent
harassment of these groups (Hosking, 1990,7475).

But,

his meager embrace of the informal groups was to change
at the historic 19th Party Congress, a change that will
have ramifications for the political system in the former
Soviet Union into the next century.
Confronted with rising conservative opposition to
his programs of reform, Gorbachev turned to the public
to assist his cause.

This political move is best seen

in Gorbachev's explicit approval of the creation of
informal organizations that would support his policy of
perestroika. The effect of this endorsement from the top
was the creation of a plethora of Marxist-Leninist
discussion groups and popular fronts for the support of
perestroika (Petro, 1991,104).

Gorbachev, in a rare move

for a Soviet leader, had turned to the public for help
and they quickly had answered his call for support.

He

commented at the same party conference that the growth
of informal organizations represented the growing diversity
of Soviet society.

Importantly, Gorbachev saw one of

the utilities of informal organizations by realizing their
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function as permanent mechanisms for "juxtaposing opinions,
criticism and self-criticism'' (Hosking, 1990, 74).
However, even with his explicit endorsement of informal
groups, it is still likely that Gorbachev wanted to protect
the primacy of the Party.
Why did Gorbachev want informal organizations?

The

answer to this question has many different components
(1) He needed societal support for his reforms to
succeed;

(2) There were economic reasons to favor the

creation of informal organizations; (3) It was necessary
to adapt to the changing Soviet society or risk losing
the leading role of the Party once and for all;

(4) Some

of Gorbachev's top advisors favored moving in the direction
of civil society; and (5) He had little idea of how to
proceed with perestroika and hoped to use these
organizations to generate new ideas and approaches.
The analysis presented earlier in this paper indicated
that Gorbachev inherited a society that was anything but
content with its lot in life.

The society was at first

cynical about Gorbachev's new promised reforms, but was
longing by 1988 for real change in the Soviet state
(Sedaitis & Butterfield, 1991,3). Gorbachev's strategy
was to drag the apolitical mass that society had become
into action by allowing them to engage in differing types
of voluntary associations (Bonnell,1991,155). Gorbachev's
reliance on society for change was driven in large part
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by the magnitude of the changes he was attempting.

Without

great social participation the state was not ready, let
alone able, to solve any new tasks.

Official documents

argue that reaching out to the social sphere was seen
as, "the key to the accelerated solution of numerous
problems, current and future, of our life." (Lewin,
1989,117)
Another very real reason that Gorbachev turned to
the public via voluntary association was, as already
mentioned, to offset conservative opposition to his
programs.

Gorbachev saw these associations as a wellspring

of support he could draw on in times of political need.
These associations were to serve as a counter-weight to
the official opposition to perestroika/glasnost among
the conservative elements of Soviet government (Sedaitis

& Butterfield, 1991, 10).

Quite simply, for change from

above to have any long-term chance for success,
mobilization from below was necessary.

The long-term

support on which Gorbachev's policy changes hinged could
only be achieved by a massive effort to mobilize society
(Bonnell, 1991, 153).
Another important consideration which motivated
Gorbachev's support for informal associations was economic
in origin.

This support once again illustrates how the

glasnost and perestroika reforms, although political in
nature, were motivated by economic considerations.
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One

of the most important informal associations for Gorbachev's
policy of economic restructuring was the cooperative.
These organizations were given official status by the
Law on Cooperatives of July, 1988.

These informal

associations quickly grew, to some 48,000 by January of
1989, providing employment to almost a million Soviets
(Bonnell, 1991, 152).

The law was important in that it

freed the new cooperative from the state; its charter
did not have to be registered with the state, and most
importantly it had the status of a legal entity (Slider,
1991,146).

This new status of the cooperative showed

the extent of support Gorbachev gave to certain informal
associations.

Do to its importance to his economic plans,

its rights were codified in Soviet law. This occurrence
is rare among informal associations and signaled the
importance he must have assigned to the cooperative.
Another likely reason that Gorbachev endorsed informal
association has to due with preserving the leading role
of the state.

If Gorbachev had not legitimized informals

their growth would likely have posed a problem for the
Party.

The informal associations, such as discussion

groups, grass roots envionmental movements, etc., even
without official endorsement, were growing to the point
of being formidable.

The lack of official approval,

coupled with the growing strength of the informal movement,
could easily have led the associations to see the Party
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as part of the problem and not the solution (Petro,
1991,128). The likely outcome of this perception would
have been to further alienate society from the state,
at the exact moment that Gorbachev desperately needed
its assistance.
The influence of Gorbachev's top advisors in his
decision to support explicitly informal associations should
not be overlooked.

A key Gorbachev advisor, Tatiana

Zaslavskaya, began arguing in the early 1980's that
interest group analysis presented the truest picture of
Soviet society.

According to her, the society was broken

into different classes having interests that conflicted
with each other.

After Gorbachev was firmly entrenched

in power, Zaslavskaya spelled out the implications of
her analysis.

She argued that people must understand

their interests and that they must be expressed. However,
verbalization of interests was not enough.

According

to Zaslavskaya, each interest must choose ''from its midst
or find a spokesman for its interests, defenders of those
interests.''

This analysis by Zaslavskaya provided a

forceful philosophical justification for informal
associations (Bonnell, 1991, 155).

It is obvious from

Gorbachev's words to the 19th Party Congress that
Zaslavskaya's influence on him was great. For example,
he acknowledged the diversity of Soviet society, clearly
rejecting the propaganda of the Soviet homogeneous society
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in favor of a more interest group oriented, heterogeneous
view.
Another top advisor, Aleksandr Yakovlev, is also
likely to have influenced Gorbachev's positive, although
late coming, support for informal association.

In 1987,

Yakovlev argued that the Soviet Union should adopt the
common law stance that "everything not explicitly forbidden
by law is permitted."

The impact of this utterance was

amazing, as Fredrick Starr noted:

As if acting on the general secretary's advice,
Soviet courts in the first half of 1987 sent back
more cases for further investigation, handed down
more acquittals, and threw out more suits than in
any previous 6-month period in Soviet history.
This action and the words of Yakovlev show a deep
understanding of the rule of law and its civil society
implications (Starr, 1988,37).

Even if Yakovlev had no

direct influence on Gorbachev's support for informal
associations, the effect of his words on the Soviet
judicial system certainly made the political atmosphere
more conducive to the growth of informal associations.
The impact of support for informals by Gorbachev
has been far reaching and will be analyzed more in the
next section. It is clear that Gorbachev to a very great
extent wagered his future, and that of the Soviet state,
on civil society and informal associations (Bonnell
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91,158).

At the very least, Gorbachev should be given

credit for inspiring the informal associations for the
support of perestroika which came into creation because
of his call at the 19th Party Congress, and of overall
making the Soviet political atmosphere more conducive
to informal associations(Petro 1991,105).
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Informal Associations, their composition and impact
in Soviet society
Informal associations in the Soviet Union and all
of their components are called coloquially "neformaly"
in Russian.

The "neformaly" revolution was the heart

of an attempt to move the Soviet Union closer to being
a civil society.

Put simply, without organizations

existing outside of the control of the states, the
neformaly, the achievement of civil society would be
impossible.

Soviet society by 1988 was increasingly

attempting to define itself and the limits of the state's
power through voluntary associations.

The purpose of

this section of the paper is to examine what informal
groups are, the number of these groups that were in
existence in the late 1980's, a breakdown of where they
occurred, who their members were, what their political
beliefs were, and their significance to society.
Informal associations can be thought of as having
three major components:
common interests;
by the state;

(1) Individuals join to further

(2) Membership is voluntary, not coerced

(3) The groups exist outside of the

boundaries of the state (Bonnell, 1991,151 ).

Of all of

their characteristics the last is the most important.
These organizations do not officially participate in the
political system, rather, their activities are conducted
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outside of "official channels"
1991, 1 ).

(Sedaitis & Butterfield,

However, simply because these groups exist

outside of the state does not mean that they are
necessarily opposed to it politically (Lewin, 1988,80).
Informal associations, while greatly different among
themselves, can be broken down in the late 1980's into
three broad types:

discussion groups, grievance

committees, and political parties. The discussion groups
met to discuss a wide variety of topics such as philosophy,
politics, history and economics.

People in these types

of groups were simply attempting to orient themselves
to the new and alien ideas that were facing them.

The

grievance committee category designates those groups which
arose spontaneously to deal with problems which the
government was unwilling or unable to solve.

The specific

problems with which the grievance committees were developed
to deal varied from ecological issues, to preservation
of historical monuments, to abuse of Party privilege.
During Gorbachev's tenure these groups were despised by
lower level party functionaries.

However, this type of

group had much protection from central party authorities
due to its functional utility.

The result was that the

lower functionaries were forced grudgingly to accept their
existence.

However, when the central party authorities

were not actively watching, these groups were often
harassed at the local level.
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The last type of group are

those which could be called embryonic political parties.
Individuals within these groups initially wanted to end
the domination of the Communist Party.

With a Central

Committee decision in February of 1990 allowing for
different political parties to exist, this category
subsequently grew. The boundaries between these types
of groups are not rigid. Rather, many groups that started
out apolitical turned political after failing to achieve
wanted change (Petro, 1991,105-106). It is important to
note that truly "apolitical" informal associations could
not exist since membership in these groups signaled a
desire to step outside of the state which was in itself
a political decision.
The tremendous explosion of neformaly groups basically
occurred overnight (Ra'anan, 1990,26).

These groups

bloomed like plants in the desert after a long overdue
rain.

The growth of these organizations increased the

most in the late 1980's, according to available statistics
(Petro, 1991,102).

Pravda has documented the tremendous

growth in these.organizations. According to Pravda, in
1988 it was estimated that 30,000 groups existed.

By

1991, this estimate had been revised to a total of around
60,000 groups.

This estimate is likely to be low since

not many unofficial groups feel compelled to register
officially with the government (Hosking, 1991, 64).
example, in Moscow in 1991, of the over 2,000 known
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For

informal associations, only 530 were officially registered
with the state (Petro, 1991,102).

There are a number

of likely reasons that many groups did not register.
First, the non-glasnost days were alive in the memories
of all Soviets citizens.

Thus, the compulsion against

registering as a possible official opponent of the regime
was still strong.

The horror of the Stalinist era still

caused fear in many and made them unwilling to register
officially as possible "political dissidents".

Second,

little was to be gained from official registration.

Since

little legal codification of rights existed for most
informal associations, the risk of registration outweighed
meager benefits.

Lastly, some analysts have argued, to

remain truly independent and outside of the state it was
necessary not to register.

This action would then indicate

a political decision among those non-registered groups
to move away from the Soviet state (Brovkin, 1990,233).
Due to their numbers and importance, one type of
informal association, environmental groups, deserves
special examination. Ecological matters, by 1989, had
become substantially important to Soviet society.
According to survey data from that year, 83.5% of Soviets
polled were deeply concerned about the state of their
environment (Ziegler, 1991,115).

This great level of

environmental concern in the late 1980's was spawned by
the Chernobyl disaster and the Soviet government's bungled
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efforts to deal with it

(Maples, 1991,138). This deep

concern about environmental issues led ecological informal
associations to be among the most popular, and numerous,
of all informal associations throughout the Soviet Union
(Petro, 1991,108). Although the exact number of informal
ecological groups was unknown, it was estimated that they
numbered in the thousands (Frerer, 1991,336). It is next
necessary to examine the nature and effects of these
groups.
Environmental groups were grass roots movements that
had started from below and wished to remain outside of
the control of the state (Altshuler & Mnatsakanyan, March
1990, 29).

Due to this characteristic, and the nature

of practices within the groups, they were of a
fundamentally democratic nature.

Most of the groups,

outside of the Russian Republic, often tied environmental
concerns together with nationalist demands (Ziegler,
1991,129,114).

This occurrence was natural since to many

non-Russian nationalities the exploitation of their
environment was indicative of a larger problem of political
exploitiation of their Republic by the Soviet state.
Accordingly, in many of the non-Russian Republics, the
environmenal groups were very political in nature.

In

some Republics, notably Ukraine, these environmental groups
later grew into Green political parties (Maples, 1991,
141- 142).
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The impact of these environmental groups has been
wide ranging.

On a practical level, most groups were

very successful in influencing decisions that affected
their environment.

For example, one Russsian environmental

group, the Lake Baikal Protection Society, brought pressure
to bear on the local government and stopped plans to divert
pollution from a paper mill into the Irkutsk river.

This

group, by 1990, had enough support to motivate the national
government, through the Central Committee and Council
of Ministers, to mandate cleanup of the Lake Baikal area
by 1995 (Ziegler, 1991,122-123).
The environmental groups had an uninteneded
consequence as many of them led to the formation of
political parties.

For example, in the Ukraine and Russia,

Green Parties were created to provide an umbrella
organization for ecologically concerned politically active
environmental groups
1991,336).

(Ziegler, 1991, 142

& Frerer,

The Greens also figured importantly in the

political makeup of the Congress of Peoples Deputies,
where it was estimated that around 15 percent of all the
deputies were Greens or interested in environmental issues
(Altshuler & Mnatsakanyan, March 1990,9).

So important

were the Greens in 1990, that the American Committee on
US-Soviet Relations noted, "Green activism is in the
vanguard of democratization throughout the USSR." (Frerer,
1991,336)
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Overall, those groups which were environmental and
nationalist in their orientation were the most successful
in inluencing policy, due to their larger base of support
(Sediatis & Butterfield, 1991,7).

However, it was exactly

these groups, in the non-Russian Republics, which caused
more difficulty by increasing nationalist separatist
demands.

These environmental nationalist groups added

another reason for the conservatives in the Party to fear
and want to suppress informal associations: they threatened
the existence of the Union.
The Russian Republic was not the center for the growth
of all informal associations.

The greatest growth of

these groups did not occur in the center, but rather,
in the non-Russian periphery of the Republics (Bonnell,
1991,155). However, my analysis will focus in this section
on informal association within the Russian Republic for
two main reasons. First, these are the associations that
many believed would be the decisive ones in influencing
the battle between conservatives and reformers within
the Soviet state (Brovkin, 1990,233).

Second, more

systematic data is available on these informal associations
than for any of the other Republics.
Within the RSFSR, the largest concentrations of
informal associations, not surprisingly, were found in
the large cities, especially Moscow and Leningrad.

The

fact that these groups existed primarily in cities has
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made some see them as "islands" within the vast and barren
political sea of the Republic (Brovkin, 1990,238).
Most participants in informal organizations were
very young. It is estimated, with the use of survey data,
that between 50 and 70 percent of youths participated
in informal associations. However, in certain cities this
number may have run higher. For example, in 1987 in Moscow,
90 percent of the members of informal associations were
under twenty-five years of age (Bonnell, 1991,156).

Survey

data from 1988 indicated that 50 percent of youths
participated irregularly in informal associations, with
only between 10 and 13 percent actively participating.
This would roughly work out to between 1.8 and 2.4 million
youths.

It is not surprising with this large youth

contingent in informal associations that it was expected
that the official youth organization Komsomol membership
would decline by at least 50 percent by 2000 (Petro,
1991,103+124).
A further breakdown on the basis of age can be seen
by examining the types of groups certain age groups
dominated.

Individuals in their late twenties and early

thirties were drawn to high profile groups that worked
for social justice.

These social justice groups were

one of the largest components of informal associations
in the RSFSR (Petro, 91,103).

Most of the individuals

who joined these social justice groups could be considered
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cultural intelligentsia.

This fact indicates what the

dominant concerns of the intellgentsia were.

However,

one has to be careful about calling all involved
individuals members in these groups.

For the most part,

members were limited to a small core and the rest could
more correctly be called supporters of the particular
association (Brovkin, 1990,245).
The membership and beliefs of informal associations
were so very diverse that the only thing that many had
in common was that they stood outside of the same
traditional political structure (Brovkin, 1990,233).
The politics of these groups also greatly varied, ranging
from the conservative nationalism of Pamyat to the
ultra-liberal tendencies of the Democratic Union.

However,

it was possible in 1989 to arrange most groups within
four broad categories:

those who supported change within

the existing structure, those who rejected the existing
structure and called for multi-party systems, popular
fronts for Perestroika which originally existed simply
to support Gorbachev's policies and became broad based
umbrella organizations, and lastly nationalist political
groups which viewed all politics through the lens of their
particular ethnic heritage (Petro, 1991,111-112).
Generally, most informal associations in the RSFSR were
liberal and desired substantial change within the Soviet
state (Brovkin, 1990,238).
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The significance of the growth of these informal
organizations cannot be overstated.

They were the

incarnation of individualism in a society which has faced
the domination of what was often the epitome of the statist
system, the Soviet totalitarian state.

The impact that

these groups have had and their significance is the next
area of analysis within the paper. This analysis will
focus on how these groups signaled a significant shift
in the Soviet political system.

The introduction and

legitimation of informal associations has ensured that
post-Soviet politics will never again be what it once
was.
The most important effect of the growth of informal
associations was the decline in the leading·role of the
Communist state.

The proliferation of informal

associations, individuals acting outside of the control
of the state, was a strong sign that the post-Stalinist
structure was in a precipitous decline. The growth of
informal organizations has shown that the perseverance
of the individual for his/her freedom can outlast the
coercive power of the state.
Increasingly, in the Soviet Union in the late days
of Gorbachev, the Party was losing the initiative to
society (Staar, 1991,128).

Public opinion was no longer

something rarely to be paid attention.

Rather, the public

was increasingly not only defining policymaking options
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but also framing the entire scope of political discussions
(Sedaitis & Butterfield, 1991, 1).

Society was assuming

this new role because "interests" were beginning vocally
and persistently to make their demands known. This
occurrence led to what Gorbachev had wanted in part,
different views on how reform should be carried out.
The tremendous impact of society influencing policy, as
opposed to it being the passive recipient of directions
from the state, can not be overstated.
The newly assertive role of society was problematic
for Gorbachev because it meant the end of the leading
role of the Party, to the reform of which he had committed
himself.

Turning to society for assistance against

conservative opposition, Gorbachev was playing a very
dangerous game.

The French social philosopher Castoriadis

has argued that Gorbachev's delusion was to believe that
he could order people into activity and still restrain
their wants and dreams with vague limits that constantly
changed (Tismaneanu, 1990,S).

The declining role of the

Party however, was not entirely beneficial for the growth
of civil society.

As will be examined later, the fact

that society challenged outright the supremacy of the
state was potentially an obstacle to the further
advancement of civil society.

Quite simply, in the later

1980's the Communist Party was not entirely down and out
and its potential for coercive behavior was truly worrisome
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to supporters of reform.
Informal associations, for the most part, did not
attempt formally to take on the central government.
Rather, the strategy of the informal political
organizations was to "take on city hall."

This strategy

led to a shift on politics from the national to the local
level where informal associations had more pull (Petro,
1991,124).

The groups at the local level, for the most

part in the late 1980's, were not yet full fledged
political parties.

Rather, they began to act as "interest

groups" advocating certain local policy options, as
Zaslavskaya had foreseen (Ra'anan, 1990,27).

At the local

level, informal organizations won significant political
battles against an entrenched Communist state over specific
problems ranging from the protection of historical-cultural
monuments targeted for destruction, to the stopping of
specific programs that would harm local environments.
The most important effect of this "localization" of
politics within the Soviet Union was that it further
entrenched the idea of civil society in society. Simple
discussion groups evolved into action groups that def ended
individual interests against the state.
Some of the more openly political informal
associations were beginning to play the role of real
"political opposition" by 1988 within the Soviet system.
Two examples bear this out: the Moscow Tribune, and the
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Alliance of the Federation of Socialist Clubs (FSOK) with
Popular Fronts.

The Moscow Tribune was a club made up

of about 100 members and was founded in October of 1988.
The group included the leading intelligentsia for radical
reform of society.

Members included R.Z. Sagdeev, Roy

Medvedev and Tatiana Zaslavskaya.

The fact that prominent

members of this "loyal opposition" were elected to the
Congress of People's Deputies moved them into the stage
of formal politics (Brovkin, 1990,240).

Members of this

group, after their election to the Congress, began to
use their informal association to influence actions within
the Congress.

The name of the association was changed

from the "Moscow Tribune" to the "Interregional Group".
The organization then adopted a platform of political
action that included universal suffrage elections for
the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, guarantees for the
sovereignty of the republics, demonopolization of the
state's control of the economy, protection for individual
rights in accordance with international human rights
agreements that the USSR had signed, and the right of
People's deputies to form parliamentary groups.

It should

be obvious that this group was no longer simply an informal
association.

TASS, the official newspaper of the party,

noted the group had become the "Soviet opposition"
(Ra'Anan, 1990,29,34,36).
The FSOK and Popular Front alliance shows another
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interesting example of informal associations becoming
political actors. These organizations in the summer of
1988 attempted to mobilize the public for Gorbachev against
conservative opposition.

This function, mobilizing support

for the leader, is very similar to functions carried out
by parliamentary parties.

If Gorbachev is thought of

as leader of an opposition group in a parliament, the
actions of FSOK and the Popular Fronts were very similar
to those carried out by the official opposition in those
systems (Hosking, 1990,70-71). Regardless, the fact that
these unofficial groups were trying to solicit support
for Gorbachev is another sign of the extent of political
change occurring in the late 1980's.
Another of the greatest signs of the degree of
political change in the Soviet Union in the late 1980's
involved the ability of informal associations to influence
the election of candidates to the Congress of People's
Deputies.

Proposals had existed, during the electoral

process to allow informal associations to nominate
candidates for office.

This move was seen by many

communists as threatening the nomenklatura system that
had been firmly in place since Brezhnev (Lapidus,
1991,142). Many party functionaries stepped up their
harassment campaigns against the informals.

Far from

intimidating the informals, it simply heightened their
resolve.

In the end, after significant interference with
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informal associations from officials, they were still
able heavily to influence the elections.

The election

results were a significant victory for the informals;
they defeated 35 obkom secretaries and 200 other high
ranking communists.

These election victories and the

attempt of the informals to influence election results
were of monumental importance.

This occurrence showed

that Soviet society was through being apolitical.
had once again become a political beast.

Society

In the minds

of many top analysts and as subsequent events have born
out, these new more politically mature informal
associations were themselves embryos of future political
parties (Brovkin, 1990, 254).
The best example of how informal associations became
interest groups can be seen in the cooperatives.

Even

after being legally allowed to exist by the 1988 law,
cooperatives still faced opposition from communist agencies
which oversaw their activities.

During the course of

1988 and 1989 it became increasingly obvious that
cooperatives were still facing harassment by certain
governmental agencies.

Individual cooperatives began

to band together to face the powerful governmental
interests threatening their very existence. They formed
in 1989 a national organization for all cooperatives called
the "National Union of Associated Cooperatives."

This

organization began to attempt to influence national
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policy-makers in meetings with them.

More importantly,

the union used its large financial resources to organize
and finance friendly political parties for election to
the Congress of People's Deputies.

For example, in

Belorussia a cooperative that made environmental monitoring
devices began to make financial contributions to the "green
movement" in the Republic (Slider, 1991,145-155).

The

development of the Union and its actions followed almost
to the letter the pattern that Zaslavskaya had foreseen
for Soviet society. The cooperatives had consciously sought
to defend their interests by uniting and influencing
political decisions that affected them; in Western theory
they had become a special interest

group~

Again, I will emphasize that the importance of the
informal associations can not be overstated.

These groups,

with their relatively young composition, have influenced,
and are likely to continue influencing politics in the
former Soviet Union for the foreseeable future.

They

have played an integral role in moving the Soviet Union
from being a stagnant monolithic state to being a dynamic
political system with official opposition, interest groups,
and most importantly individual political choices.

It

is quite possible that Trotsky's words to the Mensheviks
are resounding in the ears of former Soviet Communists.
Trotsky spoke these words, ironically a fitting epitaph
for the now dead Communist Party, "Your role is played
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out, your place is in the dustbin of History."

1990,254)
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(Brovkin,

CHAPTER IV
IMPEDIMENTS TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE SOVIET UNION
The future of civil society in the Soviet Union,
while brighter under Gorbachev than at any time since
the Bolshevik revolution, was still not certain.

Civil

society, much like Rome, could not be built in a day.
Even today, after the fall of the Communist Party and
the dissolution of the Soviet state, a full fledged civil
society does not exist in the former u.s.s.R.

There have

been a number of formidable barriers that civil society
has had to overcome to implant itself in Soviet soil:
conservative opposition, historical barriers, nationalist
demands, and the fragmentation of society.
Although Gorbachev eventually endorsed the idea of
informal organizations at the 19th Party Congress, it
must be remembered that his support was late coming and
tepid at best.

Many leaders, before and after Gorbachev's

endorsement, still had grave reservations about allowing
civil society's informal associations to grow.

Opponents

of informal associations argued that these groups were
"extremist" and were out to destroy the Communist Party
(Hosking, 1990,74).

The opponents of informal associations

reached into the highest level of government where it
is known that Igor Ligachev, a top Politburo member,
desired to crush their growth (Petro, 1991,125).
1 00

Initially, the motivating factor propelling
conservative opposition to informal associations was that
they threatened the monopoly on power the Communist Party
had.

As many top Western analysts have pointed out, civil

society cannot exist in a one party state.

Thus, for

the Soviet society to move towards civil society multiple
parties would have had to be created, which would have
cut at the heart of the party's power (Starr, 1989,308)
(Petro, 1991,125).

Analysis of the historic growth of

civil society in former Communist states indicates its
rise is accompanied by a subsequent decrease in the power
of the party-state (Kuzenstov, 1990,183).
The Party in the new environment of glasnost and
perestroika was unsure at first about how to react to
informal associations. The response, while inconsistent,
generally included harassment such as fines, imprisonment
and confiscation of materials.

The inconsistent response

by the government led to confusion about what was
permissible.

The first definitive action the state took

was in the summer of 1988 when it passed a law regarding
the rules of conduct for demonstrations and created a
special " police" riot squad to deal with the informal
associations.

In August, this new "police" squad took

it first action by crushing a demonstration to commemorate
the 20th anniversary of the occupation of Czechoslovakia
by Soviet forces. This action in August signaled an end
1 01

to the experimental permissiveness of the state.

However,

worse times were still to come.
The informal associations had always been considered
a serious threat by conservatives.

So serious was the

threat, according to a samizdat publication, that plans
had been established to disconnect some 90 percent of
private phones in Moscow if an "emergency" arose. But,
the state began to see informal associations as even more
of a threat after their success in influencing the
elections to the Congress of People's Deputies.
The informal associations had become involved in
the elections due to the harassment they had faced in
the Republic. During the elections, this harassment was
further intensified. This did not stop the informal
associations from scoring electoral success as has already
been discussed.

The state did not wish to acknowledge

that they had failed at the task of governing and that
the people wanted to replace them.

Rather, the state

argued that the electoral failure of many socialist
candidates was not the party's fault but the fault of
the informals.

It was in this mood that the Communist

Party decided it would not give up power voluntarily.
The Party in almost all Republics carried out some form
of retribution against the informals ranging from warnings
in Leningrad to shootings in Georgia.

Indeed, on the

eve of the new Congress of People's Deputies first meeting,
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there were rumors that certain Communist Party
organizations had started forming their own private
militias (Brovkin, 1990,237-252).
In late 1989, the civil society reformers faced a
great opponent, the Communist Party of the u.s.s.R.

The

Party was not willing easily to relinquish its grasp on
power.

Instead, the Party was determined to fight every

inch of the growth of civil society.

This barrier was

very formidable because of the great resources and coercive
pressure the Party could bring to bear against informals.
However, with the dissolution of the Party after the August
1991 coup, this barrier was diminished because conservative
opponents of reform could no longer bring the full coercive
power of the state to bear against the informal
associations.
One of the most formidable barriers to the
establishment of civil society in the Soviet Union has
been the historical legacy of the nation.

Previous

attempts at civil society and informal associations, for
example in pre-Soviet Russia, were very fragile and in
the end overwhelmed by the environment in which they
existed.

The one period that serves as the largest

historical obstacle for civil society is the Stalinist
period. During this time, civil society and informal
associations were overwhelmed by the concentrated power
of the state.

As has already been discussed, Stalinism
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greatly scarred Soviet society. Due to the nature of
repression during this period, society was atomized and
individuals were ingrained with a suspicion of one another.
This fragmentation created a wound within society that
still has not yet completely healed.

Overall, the

Russian/Soviet experience has yieleded few victories for
civil society advocates.

In almost every historical epoch

when democratization has occurred it has in the end been
crushed by the state.

These many losses for democratic

reformers have created an underlying attitude of "why
try?" which dissidents, and later informal associations,
have had to overcome.

However, this obstacle may be one

that has faded in the light of the new realities in the
former Soviet Union.
The nationalities question constituted another
important barrier to the growth of civil society in the
Soviet Union

As Soviet society began to act on its

realization that it was not homogeneous, certain
nationalistic elements wished to be released from the
Soviet state (Ra'anan 1990,83-84). The Soviet Union had
always been acutely aware of its nationalities problem
since the beginning days of the federation of socialist
states. However, due to the power of the Party and
intolerance for dissent, nationalist movements had been
forced deeply underground after they had arisen
sporadically. As the Party became more lenient, because
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of political decisions under Gorbachev and the "official"
toleration of informal associations, nationalist movements
came out from hiding, and quickly grew into separatist
political parties.

This occurrence had two important

effects on civil society's growth.

First, as these

separatist movements grew the Party felt increasingly
threatened as it seemed the Union was about to disintegrate
in its hands.

This threat to the Union made the Party

more reactive as a whole to informal associations.

The

first impact was to deepen the conservative opposition
to civil society ( Ra'anan, 1990,83-84).

Second, informal

associations in the non-Russian Republics took on a life
of their own.

These organizations, overall, were no longer

interested with the Soviet Union.

Instead, they wanted

to begin restoring their national independence and ethnic
heritage.

Within the Russian Republic, one of the

reactions to this occurence, was a great resurgence of
Russian nationalism.

But, even this backlash in the

Russian Republic, was not enough to stop the informal
associations in the non-Russian Republics from forcing
the transition to non-Soviet rule.
The last barrier to the growth of civil society in
the Soviet Union is one that still endures today in the
Commonwealth of Independent States,.

It is that not all

members of society care about it becoming "civil."

As

the earlier analysis on informal associations indicates
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they are made up of mainly young urbanites who are members
of the cultural intellgentsia.

This fact is important

because it means the base from which civil society could
find support, while not a static condition, was originally
limited.

Also, certain sections of Russian society, are

still conservative and anti-democratic. These sections
long for the "stability" of the past and consequently
do not want any further change.

Since all of society

has not been receptive to the message of civil society,
potential anti-civil society elements exist even in the
post-Communist Commonwealth.
This analysis of impediments to the growth of civil
society in the Soviet Union has not been exhaustive.
Rather, an attempt has been made to highlight the major
obstacles that informal associations faced in late 1989.
The most important of these obstacles was the continued
opposition to civil society of the Communist Party.
Although Gorbachev had endorsed informal associations,
official harassment of these groups still continued.
However, importantly, it was not at a level that made
the growth or participation in these groups impossible.
The nationalities problem still posed difficulty for the
growth of civil society in the former Soviet Union.
Although the Republics had gained their independence from
the center, many ethnic minorities were still contained
within individual Republics.
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As informal associations

grew in these ethnic minorities, increased pressure was
put on the individual Republics to recognize and respect
the autonomy of these groups. Even if these demands were
not of a separatist nature, as some were, they put more
demands on the already meager resources many Republics
had.

Conservative opposition, while no longer at the

helm of the state, found new allies within the Russian
nationalist movment.

This alliance of

conservatives/nationalists is likely, due to those groups'
hostility to informal assocations, to continue to pose
a substantial threat, not only to informal associations
but democratic reforms in general.

Last, the urban/rural

fragmentation of society will continue to deprive reformers
of the full support of all society.

The impact of this

can not yet be analyzed, since for all practical purposes,
the era of informal associations has just begun in the
Soviet Union.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Soviet society, during the years of Gorbachev,
underwent tremendous change.

The question which remains

is whether the civil society model helps to explain this
change.

To answer this question it is necessary to

re-examine the questions posed in the first chapter of
this thesis and analyze how well the model answers them.
To what extent does the civil society concept help to
explain the nature of the change that occurred in Soviet
society?

To what degree does the civil society concept

have indigenous roots in the Russian/Soviet experience?
What, if any, predictive validity can this model be said
to have?
There is no doubt that the changes that occurred
under Gorbachev were of a fundamental nature.

The question

the model must help to answer, to show its utility, is
how important these changes were.

The civil society

concept, as has been already discussed, focuses on society
existing independently of the state.

The society finds

cohesion within itself by forming informal associations
where individuals of like minds freely gather to discuss
ideas.

These groups may make demands on the states around

specific issues and when functioning in this role
approximate interest groups.

These groups are allowed

to exist and are protected from the state by the rule
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of law.
The model stresses that one of the importanct aspects
of these informal associations is that they limit the
power of the state over the individual (de Tocqueville,
1945,118).

Certainly, in the Soviet experience this

attribute of informal associations cannot be overlooked.
The analysis in the preceding chapters has shown how the
formation of informal associations has been in response
to social atomism forced on society by the state. The
analysis in the thesis has also shown how the informal
associations, through, for example, the dissident movement,
have broken the monopoly on ideas that the state exercised
about the future of society.

The analysis also suggests

in the Gorbachev period that society was indeed effectively
limiting the power of the state.

The greatest example

of this limitation occurred during the victory of informal
association supported candidates over Communist Party
candidates in the Congress of People's Deputies elections
in 1989.

In this instance, society was reclaiming control

over political matters from the state.
The model does have one difficulty with explaining
this importance of informal associations.

Why, if informal

associations protect individuals from the power of the
state, was the state repeatedly able to crush these
associations?

The answer to this question has a number

of different dimensions. First, and most importantly,
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civil society, before Gorbachev, was never allowed fully
to grow.

The analysis of the historical development of

civil society in the Soviet Union has indicated that at
times, previous to Gorbachev, civil society was at best
embryonic.

This immature civil society was simply not

able to withstand the power of either the Russian
autocratic, or the Soviet state.

Second, the model's

assertion that civil society protects individuals from
encroachment from the state is not meant to suggest that
it completely limits the state's power. Rather, informal
associations present a limited sphere of freedom in which
individuals operate in that it is free from state control.
Certainly, the informal associations of late Imperial
Russia, the dissident movement, and informal groups under
Gorbachev accomplished this goal.

Although not complete,

informal associations did, simply by their nature, limit
the power of the state.

Third, and last, it is impossible,

due to the historic immaturity of civil society in the
Soviet Union, to tell the extent to which these informal
groups may limit the power of the state.

Since civil

society is just currently beginning to move beyond its
embryonic stage in the Soviet Union, this judgment must
be reserved for later researchers.
The civil society model, as used in this thesis,
also contains elements of interest group articulation.
The importance of this behavior was explained in the last
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chapter in reference to Tatyana Zaslavskaya.

Zaslavskaya

and Skilling believe that society has realized its
heterogeneous nature and that individuals have begun to
look for specific groups that share their values.

These

groups have then articulated their demands on the state.
The thesis is full of examples of informal associations
asserting their specific interests to the state; they
range in focus from the dissident movement to environmental
groups.

This articulation of interests is seen as

important by the model because it is a new mechanism for
society to communicate with the state.

No longer must

individuals stand isolated against the power of the
government.

Informal associations allow individuals to

unite and compete with the state in the political arena
for power.

It should be noted that not all informal

associations attempt this interest articulation.

As the

thesis has noted, many informal associations are simply
discussion clubs.

However, the trend, even in these these

clubs has been towards a more active political role.
The model also notes the importance of informal
associations in forming political associations.

Alexis

de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, explained the
nature of this relationship:
Civil associations pave the way for political ones,
but on the other hand the art of political
associations develops and improves this technique
for civil purpose. (1945,123)
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This connection between informal associations and political
associations is clearly supported in this thesis.

To

begin with, under Soviet rule any informal association,
since it existed outside of the state was a "political"
association. Individuals, simply by associating freely
were challenging the power of the Soviet state and
consequently taking political action.

Also, some informal

associations have gone on to become true political
associations, or opposition parties, under Gorbachev.
The best example of this would be Moscow Tribune that,
once elected to the Congress of People's Deputies, formed
the Interregional Group and began to articulate political
demands.

Even the state has recognized the transformation

of the Moscow Tribune into a political opposition as was
noted by TASS's reference to them as "Soviet opposition"
(Ra'Anan, 1990,36).
Overall, the model provides a good understanding
of the nature of societal change occurring under Gorbachev.
The model highlights certain types of activity, for
example, the formation of informal associations, and helps
to explain both its practical and theoretical importance.
However, alone, this model does not explain the
significance of these events in the Soviet state.

This

understanding can only be gained by analyzing the
historical growth of civil society in the Soviet Union.
11 2

Because the model was not specifically developed to explain
societal change in the Soviet Union it minimizes the
fundamental, system changing nature of these actions.
However, this insight can be gained by examining, as the
thesis did, the historical growth, and roots of civil
society in the Soviet Union.
The next question to be analyzed is to what extent
the civil society model has indigenous roots in the
Russian/Soviet experience.

To answer this question, the

thesis examined the historical origins, and evolution,
of civil society beliefs and informal associations in
late Imperial Russia, and the Soviet era.

Put simply,

the concept has limited, but important, roots in the
Russian/Soviet experience.

The thesis has shown that

the greatest growth of civil society occurred in Russia
during the last years of the Czar.

This civil society

never completely materialized; at best, it was "embryonic."
The reasons for this lack of the growth of civil society
were several:

the historic lack of a middle class, the

autocratic nature of the state, lack of agricultural
surplus.

The fragile civil society that was established

was overwhelmed by the First World War, the Soviet
revolution, and the Bolshevik consolidation of power.
The only brief reprieve for society during this time was
the NEP period.

However, the analysis presented in this

thesis has shown that this period did not present a rebirth
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of civil society or even of informal associations. Society
was subjected after the NEP to Stalin's rule which aimed
at atomizing society and establishing state control over
the individual.

The state accomplished these goals through

a variety of different draconian measures and consequently
made sure no civil society would occur.

However,

interestingly, during this period, although civil society
and informal associations did not exist, it is clear that
the state was battling to defeat the concept's values,
such as freedom of association and the right to exist
independent of the state.

From Krushchev through Andropov,

Soviet leaders fought a battle against the dissent
movement.

This movement advocated and fought for civil

society values.

In the end, the state through coercive

measures was able to overcome the informal associations
that comprised this movement.

But, although finally

defeated, this period and movement are important because
it was the first time since the death of Stalin that
society spoke and acted independently of the state.
Under Gorbachev, the nature of the relationship
between society and state underwent a fundamental
transformation.

The state increasingly allowed society

to act independently, often simply because it could not
prevent it from doing so.

The question is, does the civil

society model have any role historically in explaining
this change?

The answer to this question must be a
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tentative yes.

First, the civil society concept is not

foreign to the Soviet Union.

As the analysis in this

thesis has shown, during important, although short-lived
periods of reform in Russia/Soviet Union, civil society
has been the ideal system reformers have been moving
towards.

This call has been the most explicit under

Gorbachev when reformers have used "civil society" as
a rallying call.

Second, the Soviet state has historically

stuggled to prevent the creation of civil society.

Since

the days of Lenin, the state has attempted to eliminate
private property, and associations of individuals outside
of the control of the state, and to limit the use of the
rule of law.

This struggle against the civil society

values was waged with greatest intensity under Stalin,
but remained an underlying current in all periods of Soviet
rule. This unifying theme among Soviet leaders illustrates
the importance of the model as embodying an alternative
set of values which the state has historically struggled
against.
Although this thesis has demonstrated that civil
society is not a foreign concept to the Soviet Union it
has also shown the hostility that exists towards the
concept.

Society, as a whole, has not overwhelmingly

accepted the message of civil society.

Instead,

historically, only certain segments of society, the
middling groups in Imperial Russia and the intelligentsia
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in the Soviet period, have supported civil society values.
This fragmentation of support for civil society values
was analyzed in detail when considering impediments to
the growth of civil society in the last chapter.

This

fragmented support for civil society, coupled with its
many losses against the Soviet state, points to the fact
that this concept, while not foreign to Soviet society,
has not been historically welcomed. This condition leads
to the conclusion that while the model has roots in the
Russian experience it does not have acceptance by most
of society.

However, among the individuals pushing for

social change, the concept has been vital.
The analysis of the origins and historical development
of civil society and informal associations in the Soviet
Union served to show the drastic new direction the Soviet
state was taking under Gorbachev.

The Russian/Soviet

states have been historically hostile to society, and
certainly to its independent operation in areas outside
of the state's control. Under Gorbachev, the historical
hostility at first was minimized, and then completely
disappeared.

The reforms taken by society were of a

fundamentally democratic nature.

The thesis has also

attempted to show the revolutionary importance of these
democratic changes, for under Gorbachev, the Soviet/Russian
people moved closer to democracy than ever before in their
nation's history.
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The last question to be analyzed concerns the
predictive validity of the civil society model.

In other

words, how well does the model predict what the actions
and motivations for societal change are?
is currently largely unanswerable.

This question

To begin with, it

is impossible to know how civil society will develop,
if at all, in the Soviet Union. Currently, civil society
once again in the former Soviet Union has achieved some
sort of embryonic existence.

However, without a crystal

ball it is impossible to tell how this system will develop.
In other words, it is currently difficult to analyze how
well the civil society model will predict the development
of civil society in the Soviet Union since the process
has just begun. Second, the model is not built to be
predictive in a hostile environment.

The civil society

model, and its founders, do not discuss what occurs to
civil society and informal associations if the state is
hostile to their growth.

These models, due to their

Western European creation, assume the state will tolerate
their growth.

However, this toleration of societal

independence has not occurred in the Soviet Union. Today,
there are still strong groups within the former Soviet
Union which call for a return to some sort of statist
system either a new autocracy, or a resumption of Communist
rule.

The model was not designed to assume these

conditions and thus reveals little insight into what will
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occur.
Further research must be done to ascertain the
predictive validity of the civil society model in the
Soviet Union.

This research is of great importance because

it will illustrate the extent to which the model is useful.
In other words, if civil society collapses in the Soviet
Union and some sort of authoritarian state is reinstated,
the civil society concept may only help to explain the
nature of change under Gorbachev. In this case, the model
would primarily be an analytic model for examining an
anomaly in Soviet history.

Further research is necessary

to modify the civil society concept to application in
non-Western environments.

In this regard, analysis of

the ongoing battle between society and state in the former
Soviet Union may be useful.

It is quite likely that an

analysis of these events could shed light on how civil
society operates in a hostile environment.
The analysis presented in this thesis indicates that
the civil society concept can help to explain the nature
of societal change that occurred under Gorbachev.

The

concept is important because it emphasizes the fundamental
importance of these changes in moving the Soviet Union
towards an alternative path of development.

The model,

combined with a historicalal overview of the growth of
informal associations in the USSR, helps in understanding
the monumental importance of this democratic alternative.
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However, the model's predictive validity is largely
unknown.

This deficiency is due in part to the fact that

a full civil society has yet to develop in the Soviet
Union.

Another major concern with the predicitive ability

of this model is that it was not developed to explain
how civil society would react to a hostile state.

Due

to this fact, this model suffers from a slight Western
bias by assuming that civil society will be allowed to
grow freely.

This has not historically been the case

in the Russian/Soviet experience.

Further research is

thus necessary to fine tune the model more for specific
application to the Soviet Union.

In the final analysis,

this model is a novel idea which helps to explain the
importance of societal change in the Soviet Union under
Gorbachev.
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